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Abstract 
 
The early history of the Interstate Commerce Commission is usually presented as the 
Congressional response to the oppressed American farmers and small commercial 
shippers due to the exorbitant rates and exploitation by the railroads. Later it is seen as an 
example of how powerful industrial interests have shaped and dominated government 
agencies. The results of the research reported in the current thesis indicates that both of 
these representations are gross over simplifications that require reconsideration.
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I  
Introduction 
 
The first independent federal commission was the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC), which was formed in 1887.  This event, argumentatively, represents a watershed in the 
relationships between the federal government and state governments, and between the federal 
government and business.1 For many the establishment of the ICC marked the “dawn of modern 
government”—the start of a major surge in growth of the federal government. 2  Since their 
inception commissions have grown and have been widely accepted as a major part of the U.S. 
government.3 
 The importance of commissions is based on the fact that modern society and 
government are maintained on the basis of “rules.” The sources of these rules and the 
mechanisms and agencies through which they originate have evolved over time.  Many of 
these rules are laws. The traditional sources of law include: common law, religious 
revelation, statutory law, equity, and executive fiat. Starting in the latter half of the 19th  
                                                     
 
1 Bollard C. Campbell, The Growth of American Government: Governance from 
the Cleveland Era to the Present (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 1, 27. 
William J. Novak, “A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture,” 12, 14. Accessed from 
http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assests/Novik History of 
Regulatory Capture(1.13).pdf. Robert E. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory 
Commission (New York: Octagon Books, 1972), 19. 
 
 2 Campbell, The Growth of American Government, 28. 
 
 3 Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commissions 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 3.  
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century, another source for rules of governance came into being in the United State of  
America—the regulation. While a regulation is not law, it serves a similar function. 
Regulations begin when groups of interested parties in a specific industry, profession, 
business association, or sector need to interact with the government; these interactions 
often lead to specialized commissions or agencies.  Commissions have even been called 
the fourth branch of government as they play a major role in creating the rules. As a part 
of the central government’s regulatory apparatus, commissions have shaped government 
and society.4 Therefore, it is important to appreciate how and why commissions came 
into being and how they have evolved. 
It is the intent of this research to gain insight into the growth of commissions by 
focusing on the development of the ICC and focusing on its place within American 
history. An underlying presupposition of the thesis is that, while the ICC shaped 
governance, the ICC was itself shaped by the events of American industrial, societal, 
political, and judicial history. As a consequence the history of the ICC must be viewed in 
the context of the history of the United States. Therefore, the starting point of the 
research and this thesis is not the ICC. The question being asked is not “How did the ICC 
come to be what it was at a particular time?” (In the opinion of this author, this leads to 
doing history in reverse.)  Rather the question for this thesis is “How did the ICC 
development in the context and within the course of history?  
 Another important consideration is the author’s view that, unlike the case in 
scientific research where the research is the background for a proposed experiment that 
                                                     
 4 Akhill R. Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and 
Principles We Live By (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 382. 
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then provides the data for the conclusions, in historical study it is the research itself that 
provides the data from which conclusions are eventually developed.  
 This thesis will specifically address the following questions:  
1) Why did Congress establish the ICC? Were there legitimate issues in the 
interactions between society and the railroads that led to the ICC?  Did the ICC 
originate out of the government’s need to fill a “gap” in the Constitution or from 
the governmental lack of expertise, or was there a need for expansion and 
delegation of powers—processes that are rooted in the chartering of the first and 
second Banks of America?5 Was the commission formed to correct the perceived 
wrongs or actual “evils,” or did it serve the purposes of powerful interest groups 
in agriculture, in the transportation of raw material or finished products? Was it 
formed in the interest of the railroads; was the ICC the start of “governmental 
solutions” to social issues that has led to “Obamacare?” Did the ICC come into 
being for purely political reasons, to appease the public, simply to save Congress 
“from having to make difficult regulations which would undoubtedly cause 
dissatisfaction in many of the groups being regulated?”6 
 
2) What were The ICC’s initial goals? How was the ICC organized to attain these 
goals and were these goals attained? 
                                                     
5 Bernstein, Regulating Business, 21. Lewis G. Vander Velde, “Thomas M. 
Cooley,” in Michigan and the Cleveland Era: Sketches of University of Michigan Staff 
Members and Alumni who Severed the Cleveland Administrations, 1885-89, 1893-93, 
Earl D. Babst and Lewis G. Vander Velde, Eds. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1948), 98. 
 
6 Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963), 6-7. 
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3) How did the original structure of the ICC evolve to become the antithesis of the 
tripartite structure of American government, and develop to become the 
foundation on which other commissions were based?  How independent was the 
commission in shaping issues of control of the transportation system at the turn of 
the 20th century or did the events and politics of the era shape the Commission?  
 
4) Why did an agency that was and is universally seen as a failure (by virtually every 
historian of the “Gilded Age” as well as economists, historians of the railroads, 
and people as diverse as Louis Brandeis and Milton Friedman) become the model 
for the “fourth branch of government?”  
 
The significance of this research is that it leads to a better understanding of how 
this organ for the origination of regulations came into being in the latter part of the 19th 
century; how the increase in the complexity of society led to the creation of increasingly 
complex governmental solutions, which in turn led to increases in government size and 
complexity that impacted on the structure of modern governmental agencies. 
Understanding this process provides insights into how to create new agencies and modify 
those in existence. These are efforts of importance given the continued development of 
new agencies and the delegation of power to them.  In the area of transportation it is 
important to understand how over-regulation almost destroyed rail transport, especially  
  
5 
 
in view of the revival of railway freight transport and the renewed interest in passenger 
rail traffic with the need to provide new, non-toxic regulation7     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
7 John R. Stilgoe, Train Time (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 
2007), 5, 217-219. 
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II  
Definition of Terms 
 
Administrative agencies, regulatory agencies, independent regulatory authorities, 
  
independent agencies and commissions are terms for specialized government 
departments. “An Independent Regulatory Commission [also Board or Agency] or a 
Commission is a community authority or government agency…employed with 
autonomous authority over a few areas of human activities in a regulatory or supervisory 
capacity.” 8 In the Federal government, at the current time, there are numerous 
commissions and agencies. They are established by the Legislative branch in statutes 
called enabling acts.9 Commissions are the independent agencies of government. They are 
established by Congress to operate in a limited area with designated missions as specified 
by Congress. Within this limited area they have the authority (granted by Congress) to 
make rules that have the force of law. Commissions are not independent of the 
Constitution or the president and are considered to be executive bodies. Commissions 
often have a tripartite structure or a quasi-tripartite structure, which includes executive, 
legislative, and judicial functions. They are headed by committee commissioners who are 
                                                     
8  Cited from Independent Regulatory Commission in “Ask.com.” Accessed from 
http://www.ask.com/1question/what-is-a-independent-regulatory-commission. 
 
9 Frank A. Schubert, Introduction to Law, 10th ed. (Boston: Wadsworth Cengage 
Learning, 2012), 476. 
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nominated by the president and approved by the Senate. Once appointed the President’s 
power to remove a commissioner may be limited; they cannot be removed except for 
cause. Often the independent agencies must be bipartisan by law.10  On the other hand, 
regulatory agencies are also a part of the Executive branch. Agencies are headed by 
cabinet secretaries or chief administrators who serve at the pleasure of the president.11   
 Block signaling or the signaling block system is a system designed to increase 
railroad safety. It controls the operations of trains between the stations by various means 
using physical equipment including: telegraphs, timetables, signal lights and/or 
signalmen. The line is divided into blocks and entrance into a block requires the 
appropriate signal.12 
 Common carriers/public roads are ruled by common law, which places special 
obligations on them. They are to be open to all and must provide services at reasonable 
and nondiscriminatory prices. There was much debate on the status of railroads, whether 
are not they were common carriers and therefore to be ruled and regulated by common 
law.13  
                                                     
10 Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution, 381-386, 409-410. “Federal Agencies 
and Commissions.” Accessed from http://whitehouse.gov/our-government/federal-
agencies-and-commissions. 
 
11 “USA.gov Inquiry: Ask how government works (#1647560).” Personal 
communication, 12/22/14, 
https://bay174.mail.live.com/?tid=cm6kUT9RmK5BG8DdidZ1x5.  Frank A. Schubert, 
Introduction to Law and the Legal System (Boston, MASS: Wadsworth Cengage 
Learning, 2012), 472. 
 
 12 J. B. Calvert, “Manual Block in the United States.”  
Accessed from http;//mysite.du.edu/-etuttle/rail/manual.html. 
 
 
13
 James W. Ely, Jr., Railroads and American Law (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2001), 17, 71-77. 
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The Dormant Commerce Clause is attributed to John Marshall. It is not found in 
the Constitution. The “clause” prevents states from passing laws in an area in which they 
would conflict or impede a federal law (expressed preemption) or objectives (implied 
preemption).14 
The power of the executive branch is vested in the head of state. This head of 
state is responsible for implementing and enforcing law. The President is the Chief 
Executive of the United State.15  
 Fast-freight lines were lines, nominally independent stock companies, that offered  
shippers faster and more reliable service than the railroad freight services. They owned 
their rolling stock that could be operated over the tracks of different rail lines. As a result 
the lines were required to cooperate in an administrative pool. Railroad officials and 
corporations were commonly financially involved in the fast-freight lines. These lines 
drew off a high volume of the higher-rate traffic. As they were not originally controlled  
under the ICC, their economic impact is not regularly mentioned.16 
             There are many candidates for the title of the fourth branch of government (since 
the term itself is poorly defined). The term is usually applied to the various non-elected, 
                                                     
14 Michael Arnheim, U. S. Constitution for Dummies (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley 
Publishing, 2009), 103-105.  “The Dormant Commerce Clause,” from National Paralegal 
College. Accessed from 
http://nationalparalegal.edu/conLawCrimProc_Public/Congressional/Powers/DormantCo
mmerce Clause.asp. 
 
15 “Executive Branch.” Accessed from http://whitehouse.gov/our-
government/executive-branch. 
  
16 Albro Martin, Railroads Triumphant: The Growth, Rejection and Rebirth of a 
Vital American Force (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 203-204. John F. 
Stover, American Railroads, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1997), 139-
140. 
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but sometimes appointed groups that can exert significant and lasting power on the 
central or local governments. Candidates for the fourth branch include: the press, the 
people, the special interest groups and administrative agencies (independent regulatory 
authorities or commissions).17 
The Grange or The National Grange of the Order of Husbandry was established 
in 1868 by Oliver Hudson Kelly as a fraternal organization for farmers.  Its focus was on 
the welfare of farmers. One of its earliest concerns was the cost of shipping agricultural 
produce by railroad and the pricing involved. This perceived abuse of the farmers by the 
carriers is one of the major factors that some historians of the 19th century feel ultimately 
led to the formation of the ICC. The Grange movement led to early state laws to regulate 
the pricing of the rail carriers.  As a political organization the Grange lost its power by 
the late 1870s.18     
 Internal improvements are centrally funded public works for purposes of creating 
a transportation infrastructure.  Initially, they were part of the “American System.” 
Internal improvements include: roads, harbors, and canals.19 
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was established by the Interstate 
Commerce Act of 1887. Its provisions applied to “the transportation of passengers or 
property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad and partly by water when both are 
                                                     
17 Vander Velde, “Thomas M. Cooley,” 98. 
 
18 Stewart H. Holbrook, The Story of American Railroads (New York: Legacy 
Press, 1947), 236-241. 
 
 19 Tom Downey, review of John Lauritz Larson, Internal Improvement: National 
Public Works and the Promise of Popular Government in the Early United States. H-Pol, 
H-Net Reviews. Accessed from http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=6907. 
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used.” 20  The ICC was (argumentatively) the first independent federal commission to be 
established. Its history and early development will be considered in detail in this thesis.    
According to the Constitution, the judiciary branch is the sole power that can 
interpret law and determine the constitutionality of law. It also has the authority to apply 
law in specific cases. Courts can also compel testimony and evidence, and define and 
order punishment or consequences for violating the law.21  Citing Justice Holmes, the 
courts deal “under laws already supposed to exist.”22 
Laws are the rules of conduct of an organized society that are made, accepted, and  
enforced by that society under the threat of punishment by that society. Definitions of law 
often include the multiple sources of laws. The sources that are most often mentioned are 
common law and civil law.23  
The legislative branch is the sole division of government with the authority to 
enact legislation.  According to Justice Holmes, “legislation … looks to the future and 
changes existing conditions by making a new rule.”24 Legislation is the origination of 
laws, or set of laws made by a government.25  In the USA the legislative branch was 
                                                     
20 “Transcript of the Interstate Commerce Act (1887).” Accessed from 
http://www.ourdocumentsds.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=49&doc=49&page=transcrpt. 
 
21 “Judicial Branch.” Accessed from http://whitehouse.gov/our-
government/judicial-branch. 
 
22 Friedman, “A Word about Commissions,” 707. 
 
23 “Law and Legal Definition,” in USLEGAL.com.  Accessed from 
www.uslegal.com/l/law. 
 
24 Cited from Friedman, “A Word about Commissions,” 707. 
 
25 “Legislative Branch.” Accessed from http://whitehouse.gov/our-
government/legislative-branch. 
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established by Article One of the Constitution. In the USA the legislative branch is the 
Congress, which consists of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The legislative 
branch can delegate the authority to make laws (regulations) to the agencies or a 
commission of the government.  
 “Long-short haul” rates applies to the practice of charging shippers more per mile 
for freight hauled over short distances than long distances. Long-short haul rates are 
discriminatory. They were justified on the grounds that it was less expensive per mile to 
ship for longer distances then for short distances. Special circumstances were sometimes 
used to justify the rates.26  
 Pools or divisions of traffic were arrangements among groups of railroads that 
operated in geographical areas.  Pools divided up business and/or traffic and set rates to 
avoid disastrous competition.27 
 Private cars (see also fast-freight lines above) covers the cars that were not 
directly owned by a railroad but which operated on tracks owned by railways. They were 
hauled either as a part of a train or exclusively by a locomotive belonging to a specific 
line. Examples include cars privately owned by wealthy individuals or more commonly 
cars owned by a business or producer designated for specialized usage (e.g., oil tankers,  
circus trains, or refrigeration cars).28 
                                                     
26 Robert W. Cherny, American Politics in the Gilded Age: 1868-1900 (Wheeling, 
IL: Harlan Davidson, 1997), 78-79. 
 
27 Cherny, American Politics, 79. 
 
 
28 Martin, Railroads Triumphant, 204. Stover, American Railroads, 153, 155. 
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 Rebates covers reduced rates or refunds given to major shippers by railways in 
return for their business. They were often discriminatory in nature.29 
Regulations are rules, orders or requirements that must be fulfilled and that have 
the force of law. Regulations are applied to those who are under the control of the 
specific authority.30  They are issued by the agencies or the commissions (under 
executive control) that have been given a mandate to carry out the intent of Congress, 
often with input from the concerned parties and the legal profession.31  Regulations 
derive their legal authority through the legislature. 
 Regulatory capture is the process in which, over time, an industry comes to 
dominate the commission or agency that had been set up to regulate it.32 
A tripartite government is a government that is comprised of three divisions each 
with its own defined independent powers and responsibilities, based on the ideas 
expounded by Montesquieu in The Spirit of Laws. Tripartite governments are divided into 
an executive branch, a legislative branch, and a judicial branch. The government of the 
USA is typically represented as a tripartite government.  
 Value-of-service rates are rates based on the value of an item and the amount the 
shipper is willing to pay to have it transported. This was a method of charging shippers  
                                                     
29 Cherny, American Politics, 79. 
 
30 “Regulation,” The Free Dictionary. Accessed from http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.co/regulation. 
 
31 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 284-285. 
 
 
32 “Regulatory Capture,” from Economics A-Z terms: The Economist. Accessed 
from http://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z/r#node-21529846. 
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where monopolies existed and the exact shipping cost was difficult to calculate.33  
 Watering of stock was the specialty of Daniel Drew (the pious cattle drover 
turned stock trader).  Watering is a fraud in which a company inflates the values of its 
stock shares over the value of its assets.34 Through watering, a company accumulates 
excess capital illegally, but has to pay a return based on an inflated value (e.g., the movie 
and Broadway show, The Producers).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
                                                     
33 Ari Hoogenboom and Olive Hoogenboom,  A History of the ICC: From 
Panacea to Palliative (New York: W. W.  Norton, 1976), 8. Gabriel Kolko, Railroads 
and Regulations: 1877-1916 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1965), 1-6. 
 
 34 H. W. Brands, American Colossus; The Triumph of Capitalism (New York: 
Anchor Books, 2010), 17-20. Christian Wolmar, The Great Railroad Revolution: The 
History of Trains in America (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 239. 
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III 
The Origin of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
 
In the United States the laws made by legislative bodies are only one way in 
which society is maintained and regulated.  Regulations promulgated by state and federal 
agencies or commissions are another way. To gain insight into the origin of the 
independent commissions, which are the sources of these regulations, it is important to 
understand the history of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)—the first 
independent commission. Moreover, it is also important to understand that the ICC is 
important not only as the first independent commission, but also as the first attempt by 
the federal government to regulate any industry.35 This history can be approached in 
various ways. Typically the origin of the ICC has been approached by looking at the 
close relationship of the ICC to the development of the railroad system. This is an 
approach that is validated by the fact that from the beginning the ICA was not about 
interstate commerce but about the control of railroads (see definition of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission). This approach focuses particularly on four groups: the farmers, 
the merchants, small independent oil producers, and the railroad men and their role in the 
origin of the ICC.36 Theories supporting the primacy of each of these groups in the origin 
                                                     
35
 “Interstate Commerce Act,” from WGBH. Accessed from 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/american experience/features/general-article/streamliners-
commerce/. 
 
36 Woll, American Bureaucracy, 38-40. Hoogenboom, A History of the ICC, 8. 
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of the ICC have both supporters and critics. In addition to these approaches, the ICC has 
also been frequently addressed in terms of the history of railroads. In the current thesis 
several approaches will be used in the hope that the result will lead to a more complete 
and nuanced understanding of the origins of the Commission. While this approach may 
lead to some redundancy, it stems from the observation that history varies depending on 
perspective and context; this thesis will attempt to show the discrepancies that exist 
among the approaches that have been used, and to reconcile them when possible. First the 
origin of the ICC will be examined in the light of the evolution of the railroads. Then, the 
origination of the ICC will be approached as reflected in the “original” intent of the 
founders of the Republic as expressed in the U. S. Constitution and affirmed in cases of 
the Supreme Court of the United States. Also, as the ICC was the work of multiple 
individuals, their understanding and goals for the commission, which led to the passage 
of the Interstate Commerce Act, will be examined, especially focusing in the 
contributions of Thomas H. Reagan and Shelby Cullom.  Financial and managerial issues 
in the establishment of the railways and their implication for the origin of the ICC will 
then be reviewed. Finally, the development of the ICC will be reexamined as a part the 
historical evolution of state and federal bureaucracies and governmental agencies. In no 
case will history be viewed retrospectively to explain or justify a development in the 
origination of the ICC.  
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The Origin of the Interstate Commerce Commission: The Railroads, Social and Political 
Issues in 19th-Century America 
 The early history of the railroads in the United States is a story of conflicts: 
interrelations between the railroads, interstate commerce, the demands of American 
society, agricultural interests, and labor and industry, as well as the issue of the balance 
of power between the states and the federal government were all factors that contributed 
to the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (ICA) and the formation of the 
ICC. Therefore, it is important to understand the history of these relationships.  The story 
of the railroads is connected to the early history of the ICA and therefore particularly 
important to the understanding of the origin of the ICC.37 
 Early in the development of the United States the need for better internal 
transportation, both for purposes of communication and for the movement of raw 
material and finished goods, was recognized as vital for the growth of the country. It was 
felt this would provide financial benefits and lead to the interconnection and 
interdependence of regions within the country. Opposition came from those who 
perceived the promotion of “internal improvements” (a centrally financed transportation 
system and infrastructure) as a threat to state sovereignty—a fear of strengthening a 
centralized power; in particular there was a southern fear that a strengthened federal 
government dominated by the northern states would threaten their peculiar institution. 
There was also opposition to taxing one region of the country or of the population to 
                                                     
 37 Joshua Bernhardt, The Interstate Commerce Commission: Its History, Activities 
and Organization (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1923), (Reprinted New 
York: AMS Press, 1974). 
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benefit another, or taxing a sector of the economy to the benefit another; there was no 
plan that satisfied all parties. 38  However, this need became critical after the War of 1812 
and was a part of the “American System” as advocated by Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, 
and the National Republicans (in addition to internal improvements the National 
Republicans were the advocates of protective tariffs and a national bank). The movement 
for a centrally financed internal transportation system was ended when President James 
Madison vetoed the Bonus Bill of 1817, which would have financed and brought a 
national transportation network into being, on constitutional grounds. With the death of 
the Bonus Bill and the limited success of the National (Cumberland) Road and canals, the 
burden of internal improvements fell on the states who proved unable to fulfill their 
constituents needs for a multitude of financial and political reasons.39 As a consequence 
of the inability and the failure of the state and federal governments there was “no 
transportation network [with]in the United States” in the early 18th century.40  The need 
for a national transportation network and the lack of government interest or ability 
became the impetus to build the railroads came from private entrepreneurs who built the 
lines to make a profit. They were subsidized by local and less commonly state  
governments.41 From the start the railways were operated under state charters.  
                                                     
 38 John L. Larson, Internal Improvements: National Public Works and the 
Promise of Popular Government in the Early United States (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2001), 50. 
 
 39 Ely, Railroads and American Law, 1-4. 
 
 40 Richard D. Stone, The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Railroad 
Industry: A History of Regulatory Policy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 1. 
 
 41 Downey, “Review of John Lauritz.” 
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The first functioning steam-driven trains on rails were developed in Wales for use 
in hauling freight in 1804.  Great Britain’s and the world’s first passenger carrying rail 
line, the Stockton and Darlington Railway, was incorporated in 1825 (originally it 
consisted of wagons that were pulled by horses and only later by steam locomotives). The 
first true railroad was the Liverpool and Manchester, which opened in 1830.   Maryland 
chartered the Baltimore and Ohio in 1827 and construction started on the line in 1828. In 
America, passenger service was initiated with the first American-made locomotive to pull 
a train, The Best Friend of Charleston, which ran on the Charleston and Hamburg 
Railroad in December of 1830 in South Carolina, and the British made John Bull on the 
Camden and Amboy Railroad of Pennsylvania in 1831.42 
 At its beginning, the American rail network was not conceived as a nationwide 
system, rather it started in numerous locally built and financed small lines that connected 
two points to promote local commerce. Often the very existence of a town (especially 
later in the West) depended on proximity to a railway; these railways were often weapons 
in the wars for economic survival and commercial supremacy between the towns.  As the 
lines consolidated, towns were later to become the captives to the lines they built.43  
  Among the first opponents of the railroads were their competitors, those whose 
livelihood the rail carriers threatened the most. These groups included the people who ran 
the canals and turnpikes and those dependent on the canals and turnpikes for a living 
(including the towns on the right of way, barge owners, inns, laborers who loaded and 
unloaded barges, and suppliers of horses and wagons among others). The consequences 
                                                     
42 Wolmar, The Great Train Revolution, 20. 
  
 43 Stone, The Interstate Commerce Commission, 2-3. 
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were the earliest anti-rail legislation and a series of law suits.44 It is probable that some 
legislators saw this conflict as a highly profitable opportunity, and fostered or threatened 
laws that restricted the railways. The lines responded with attempts to influence 
legislators.  It was been stated that the legislators who supported early construction were 
rewarded liberally.45  The most visible and widespread response on the part of the 
railroads were the free passes given by the railroad lines to local officials, legislators, 
clergy, and various other categories of important notables, their families and friends, all 
in an attempt to shape the public’s  opinions and legislation.46 Over time these passes 
came to be expected by their recipients.  
             Conflicts along the right of way were another source of early problems for the 
lines. Sparks from the trains set fires to the fields, and the trains frightened and killed 
livestock (giving rise to the American invention of the cowcatcher); they sprayed clean 
laundry with cinders and soot. These were issues that were probably of more concern to 
the average person than the numerous accidents and equipment failures that were taking 
place.47  
 Another of the earliest conflicts had to do with clerical opposition. By the 1840s 
rail business had increased and trains began to run freight and passenger trains on 
Sunday—the Sabbath. This provoked a clerical response. Whether this opposition arose 
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from the idea that “Sabbath trains” were an affront to God’s Law or the trains were a 
threat to Church attendance is not clear.  The religious opposition lessened during the 
Civil War (a time window that also provided the political opportunity to create the 
transcontinental railroad, with Congress under control of the Republicans, who favored 
commercial and industrial expansion).48  Religious opposition was revived after the war, 
only to die out in the 1870s. The direct effect of this early opposition was to contribute to 
the demise of some lines and cause some changes in scheduling.  Additionally, residual 
opposition may have contributed to the Granger Laws. 49 
 As the railways grew it became obvious that some type of governmental response 
and mediation, beyond the charters that had been granted, was going to be necessary. The 
first state commission was set up in Connecticut in 1832. In 1844 the first laws against 
rate discrimination were passed in Rhode Island.50 In 1869, Massachusetts became the 
first state to establish a “supervisory” state railroad commission (which was also known 
as a “weak commission”) and other states followed the Massachusetts model for their 
commissions.51 Under this model the commissions could censor the lines, but were 
without significant enforcement power. As a result the laws were ignored and freely 
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violated.52  Other complications arose for interstate transport when the states enacted 
“dissimilar laws on similar subjects” or laws that discriminated against out-of-state  
 The National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry—the Grange—was founded by 
Oliver Hudson Kelly in 1867.  It quickly grew in the agriculturalist communities, 
particularly in the Midwest and the South.  Among the prime concerns of the Grange 
members included what they saw as abuses in the cost of transporting their products by 
rail, high elevator storage fees in grain elevators (sometimes owned by the train lines) 
and high fees they paid for the finished products sold to them by the local merchants 
(who also shipped by rail).53  As a result the Grangers targeted the railroad companies. It 
should be noted that the “abuses” were in no way illegal at that time, and were usually 
practices that were “rational” in the views of those providing freight services, based on 
the track systems then available.54  Also, farmers were the victims of their  
own success—as their production increased the market value of their produce fell.  
Additionally foreign market fluctuations were often beyond the control of the farmers or 
the railroad managers.55 
In response to the Grange’s pressure various state railroad laws were introduced 
and passed to control rates (known as the Granger Laws) with Grange support. In 1873, 
under Granger influence, Illinois passed laws to create a commission that could enforce  
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orders—a “supervisory-mandatory” body— and set maximum rates.56 However, these 
state commissions proved to be unable deal with the complex problems of expansion and 
of interstate commerce.  Railroads found ways to evade or nullify the goals of the laws. 
When Wisconsin passed the Potter Law of 1874, which established unreasonably low 
freight trains rates, the lines responded with poor quality and service—the so-called 
“Potter trains.” The Granger laws frequently adversely affected the local economies (by 
reducing regional investment in local rail service) and reducing the value of train 
securities (contributing to the Panic of 1873).57 Also, after the laws were passed the 
coalitions that sponsored them often disintegrated, which left the laws and their 
interpretations at the mercy of the railways.  
 By the mid 1870s the Grange was on the decline. In part this was due to an 
ongoing demographic shift as American moved from rural to urban areas. This was 
accompanied by the start of the mechanization of farming. In the opinion of James Beck, 
a former Solicitor General of the United States, there was justification for the Grange 
movement, but it “carried the nation into the extreme interference with business…a 
remedy may often be worse than the disease.”58 After the Grange’s collapse many 
remaining farmers went on to join more politically active and radical anti-railroad 
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organizations and the Populist movement.59As a result of the responses of the carriers and 
the change in political support in the 1870s many of the Granger laws were repealed.60  
 In the early 1860s merchants and in the 1870s independent oil companies also 
began to complain of rate discrimination (especially those that favored Rockefeller’s 
Standard Oil).  Rate discrimination arose from the chaotic growth of railroads, which 
ended in duplication of available tracks, high fixed railroad costs and the need for the 
lines to maintain financial viability. Shelby Cullom’s 1886 commission (one of the 
precipitants of the ICA) listed a history of eighteen ‘causes of complaints’ against the 
railroads, mostly involving discriminatory rates, fluctuating rates and charges of pooling 
and monopolies.61 
 There were three major areas of discrimination: between people, geographic 
regions and commodities.  The major mechanisms of rate discrimination were pooling, 
long-short haul rate discrimination and rate rebating for larger shippers.  
Pooling arose as the railways attempted to control what became ruinous price 
wars between competitors on trunk lines with the resulting disastrous cutting of rates. 
Under pooling, groups of railroads developed written and unwritten agreements amongst 
themselves that assigned traffic and revenues in specific geographic areas to specific 
members of a pool in order to fix and stabilize rates.  Albert Fink, who chaired the Joint 
Executive committee, was the nation’s leading advocate of pooling, which did help 
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stabilize rates for a time. Pools, regulation of rates or some division of labor were legal 
and prevalent outside of the US, where railroads were often run under control by the 
state.62 The major issue against pools was the charge that they stifled competition. 
Pooling would inevitably fail because the lines ultimately cheated on their agreements 
and there was no legal enforcement mechanism.63 As an example, rate wars were 
aggravated when bankrupt lines, free of the need to make interest payments, lowered 
rates to make themselves more attractive for takeover bids.64 
 Long-short haul rate discrimination arose as a result of financial pressures and the  
 
complexity of rate setting.65 The first consideration in rate setting was the fact that the  
 
major competition among the railroads was on the trunk lines (the major routes between 
the big cities—where multiple lines competed), on inland and on the coast routes, where 
water transportation existed to compete with trains. Because of this competition lines 
would even carry freight at a loss in order to win business. The second consideration was 
that fixed costs made short hauls more expensive per mile. Finally, there was less 
competition amongst the trains on the branch lines—smaller routes between rural areas, 
which were distant from other transportation options. The result of all of these factors 
was that short haul rates over the branch lines were often higher than the rates to haul the 
same products, the same distance, over the trunk lines. For example the rate from 
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Minneapolis-St. Paul to Chicago was 12.5 cents per hundred pounds while the rate from 
small towns in Minnesota to St. Paul was 25 cents per hundred pounds.66   
 From the perspective of the rail operators the essential problem was that if the 
railroads were forced to compete, their tariffs on trunk lines were pushed down and they 
had to make up their losses on the short hauls and branch lines. According to James C. 
Clarke, president of the Illinois Central, the only option to high short-haul rates was to 
“increase the long haul or through rates.”67 As noted by Ely “[a]ny proposed rate system 
produced a vigorous protest from someone.”68  
The issue of fair and appropriate rates was complicated by the fact that the lines 
faced different operating costs in different geographical areas and often had a poor idea 
of their expenses. As a result they tended to value-of-service or “all the market can bear 
ratemaking.”69 
 The best way to avoid the rate wars was to form pools, but the ICA made pools 
illegal and as noted. Pooling could not succeed due to lack of legal support and 
enforcement.  From the perspective of the shippers the low rates on the trunk lines were 
the result of competition and therefore competition was good.70  However, A. B Stickney, 
a maverick rail president who favored rate regulation, felt competition would not reduce 
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costs or rate discrimination, as did Charles Francis Adams, Jr., a president of the Union 
Pacific (from 1884 until 1890 when he was ousted by Jay Gould).71 It was pointed out 
that competition led to disruptive and destructive rate wars and was contradictory to 
stability.72  In fact one of the causes of the rate reduction that occurred from 1865 to 1885 
was the reduction of competition, which resulted from pools.73 Over time this view was 
recognized by members of the ICC; in 1898, the ICC even argued that “competition was 
wasteful.”74 One solution, advocated by Milton Smith of the Louisville and Nashville 
(and in his opinion acceptable to most other railway managers), would have been to allow 
pools that were monitored, approved, and legally enforced by a government 
commission.75 
Rate “adjustments” through reclassification, rebates, and bulk discounts was the 
third major discriminatory mechanism. The lines’ goals were to increase traffic over 
underutilized track, fill empty freight cars, compensate for losses incurred for passenger 
services and encourage economic growth in certain areas. It is often put forth that the 
large companies were the big beneficiaries, especially Standard Oil. However, Andrew 
Carnegie’s steel company was in an area serviced only by the Pennsylvania Railroad. As 
a result he paid higher rates than his rivals and even allied himself with Vanderbilt to 
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challenge the Pennsylvania Railroad.76 Standard Oil, in a region with multiple competing 
lines, was able to get rebates by promising to ship sixty carloads of oil daily and playing 
the competing lines against each other.  To achieve this volume Rockefeller had to 
coordinate his shipment with those of smaller refiners (some of whom bitterly opposed 
rebates until they joined Rockefeller’s group and then benefited from the rate 
reductions).77 This arrangement allowed the shippers to reduce their round-trip time from 
Cleveland to New York from thirty to ten days and their fleet size from 1800 to 600 
cars.78 In this case the rail lines benefited from the larger contracts, but this was not 
usually the case. Rebates also occurred on a smaller scale; in one case a railroad paid a 
shipper’s telegraph bills in return for his business; in another a rail line gave a receipt for 
seventy-five barrels of whiskey when only seventy-three barrels were actually shipped, 
which allowed the shipper to make a claim for two “lost barrels.” Understating the class 
or weight of shipments was another way to rebate.79 Drawbacks were an extreme form of 
rebates. A drawback was a refund on the rate paid by competitor. If Standard Oil paid 10 
cents on a barrel of oil and its competitor paid 35 cents, 25 cents was refunded to 
Standard Oil (this amounted to $10 million over one and a half years).80 Rebates arose as 
a consequence of the pressures of competition; in 1880 William K. Vanderbilt’s company 
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granted six thousand special rates.81 In 1879 Vanderbilt told the 1879 New York Hepburn 
committee 
 My instructions are, to do the business, get our share of it as against all 
 competitors, and to do the business at the same price that they do….The day of 
 high rates has gone by, and railroad men have come to that conclusion; got to 
 make money now on the volume of business….I do think it is perfectly proper for 
 a common carrier to vary his price according to the volume of traffic he has.82 
 
Another form of discrimination that cost the lines and its passengers in the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars was the free pass. Originally it started as a bribe for rail-
friendly public officials but it evolved into an entitlement that antagonized paying 
passengers. John Walker, a president of the Burlington, said, “I think the grant of a free 
pass to make one friend creates a dozen enemies.”83 It should be made clear that while 
rebates and free passes were accepted railroad practices they were not financially 
advantageous for the railways; one of the goals of the pools was to eliminate them.  
Another major complaint, by some accounts the major complaint from the 
shippers, was the uncertainty of rates. This was a greater problem than discriminatory 
rates. Due to rate wars, published rates could vary forty to sixty times in a year.84  
Despite the complaints against the railroads and rate discrimination, rates 
continued to fall, as the lines modernized. At the same times competition was reduced, 
for a short time, through attempts at pooling and a worsening of the financial situation in 
the latter half of the1870s. Eastbound first-class freight rates went from one dollar to 15 
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cents per hundred pounds and westbound rates from 75 cents to 25 cents; from 1865 to 
1885 rates generally fell a third to a half.85  
Even with all of the railroad’s machinations, the underlying issue was that the 
systems were redundant and inefficient. Their finances were shaky and contributed to the 
depressions of 1873 and 1893, after which many of the lines were forced into 
receivership.86  
 Safety concerns were another major issue, not only for railroad companies but 
throughout all of the newly emerging industries.87  Railroad accidents and deaths were 
common.88 The carnage also led to financial losses through suits based on industrial 
accidents that harmed society, consumers, and equipment, and most importantly created 
disruptions in service.89  It should be noted that while the US railroads were poorly built 
and “disaster-prone,” safety concerns that may have been the primary reason for 
regulatory action in the United Kingdom seem to have been less important in early US  
train management (and railroads addressed many of these issues—safety airbrakes  and 
automatic coupling—on their own).90 It is frequently noted the European train systems 
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were built to avoid accidents, while trains in the U. S. were built so that passengers would 
survive accidents.  
The 1870s were a time of economic problems in the United States. The panic of 
1873, caused in part by the failure of Jay Cooke’s financing of the Northern Pacific 
Railroad (based on issues as diverse as the Franco-Prussian War and a letter from Custer 
describing the ferocity of the Sioux, which added to the investors’ concerns that the line 
could not be built), led the lines to cut wages. Initially the result was only minor 
ineffectual protests.91  As the economic picture worsened, wages were cut 10 per cent in 
1877 for the Pennsylvania, Erie, Michigan, Southern, Lake Shore, New York Central, 
Baltimore and Ohio as well as for other lines. The first protests and work actions against 
the wage cuts came from the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and the firemen and 
brakeman of the B&O line in Maryland. The local militias were called out to address the 
unrest.  When the militias were reluctant or refused to intervene, the Governor of West 
Virginia petitioned for and got Federal troops to guard the trains. The strikes were broken 
in Maryland only through the use of the National Guard and resulted in a considerable 
number of dead and injured workers. Similar strikes occurred in Pennsylvania, New 
York, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. Police, National Guard, and ultimately regular 
Federal troops had to be called out.  In all a total of about 100 people died and more than  
500 were injured in the rioting.92 Throughout history Americans have had mixed feelings 
towards the railroads. At the onset, the railways were supported at almost any cost. By 
providing faster, safer, and cheaper transportation for people and goods, the railroads 
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opened vast areas to farming and settlement—they created towns and markets; they 
permitted exploitation of resources, which led to innovations, which resulted in new 
industries. For these reasons they attracted financing by farmers and local business 
owners, who mortgaged their farms and businesses to build them hoping for financial 
gain. This made these farmer/investors vulnerable to the business practices of the railroad 
companies in addition to the risks that they were exposed to by variation in the 
commodity markets.93  
The railroads were undeniably poorly managed; at times they were overly 
capitalized, at other times undercapitalized. Lines were frequently loaded with debt and 
poorly conceived, leading to “panics and crashes ruining the greedy hopeful men who 
invested in them.”94  The “predatory” rate wars and corrupt business practices of the early 
railroads are legendary and well accepted by all.95 The picture presented is that they  
“cheated their shareholders, overcharged their customers, and abused their workers.”96 In 
addition to the control of the managers of the train lines these small entrepreneurs and 
investors became vulnerable to business cycles and events that were far removed and 
little understood by them.  These events not only added to price fluctuations of the 
commodities they produced, but also to the high costs of shipping their produce to distant 
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markets, which was controlled by the same railroads they had financed. Consequently, at 
the same time shipping rates were high, returns on the investments in the railroads were 
likely to be disappointing.97 Another inherent problem that the Western producers had to 
face was their distance from Eastern markets, which added to their costs and made it 
difficult to compete with Eastern producers.98 Due to the complexity of the interactions, it 
is not always easy to determine which accusations made by the Granges were true and 
which were distortions to flame the anti-railroad crusade. For example: from 1870 until 
1896 agricultural prices dropped and freight rates dropped at the same time.99  The 
farmers lost more on the drop of prices than they saved on the reduced freight rates. Since 
the prices paid in distant markets could not be controlled locally, the farmers organized 
against the railroads.  When attempts by the Granger movement to increase the farmers’ 
control over the pricing of their produce failed it was demonstrated that solutions were 
not easy.  
The issues of railroad finance and corruption will be discussed separately. 
Much of the anger against the railroads was justified. The Cullom commission of 
1886, one of the precipitants of the ICA, provided eighteen causes of complaints. But it 
has also been argued that the American railroads were overly vilified and that attention 
has been focused on them as faceless and impersonal corporations, “rail rogues” and 
“robber barons.” This is an attitude seen in the popular culture’s glorification of the train 
robbers (most famously Frank and Jesse James, and Butch Cassidy) and hoboes, and a 
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disparagement of those enforcers of the lines, the Pinkertons; this is an altitude that 
continues to the present day.100 It should not be forgotten that the growth of the rail 
systems had numerous positive impacts. It was influential and associated with the spread 
of the telegraph, the birth of new industries, growth of cities, the gold standard, and the 
increased power of the corporations, banks and investment elites that led to the resulting 
concentration of wealth, not to mention the homogenization of society that helped to 
unify the country and gave rise to the nationalism that threatened restrictive, “small 
town” or regional views of society, all of which were inimical to the American tradition 
of the agriculturalist.101 In most regards this was a continuation of the conflict between 
the Jeffersonian and the Hamiltonian perspectives. For the farmers, despite its benefits, 
the railroads endangered their way of life. Nationalization and unification threatened the 
identities of small farms and villages. It reduced their influence and the influence of their 
leaders and state dignitaries.102  Other facts that led to hostility towards the railroads 
included: the consolidation of the lines, which lessened their connection to local interests, 
the stories of the railroad stock swindles, and fears that the lines were corrupting 
politicians.103  All of these issues led to the rise of the People’s Party (Populists) in 1891. 
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The Populists viewed railways as “public highways”—“common carriers”—built using 
public funds and subsidized by mail contracts—that should not be under private 
domination according to common law.104 Originally the Populists supported state 
commissions, but these commissions failed and finally the Populist solution to the 
problems, real or perceived, was that the railroads had to be taken over, or at least  
regulated by the federal government. 105 
 By the 1870s it was the view of many that the railroads had to be brought under 
some kind of centralized control. This view of the railways has been summarized by 
Holbrook: the railroads were a “law unto themselves. They bought United States Senators 
and Congressmen…with cash. They ran trains when and where and how they pleased. 
They charged what they would…corrupt is none too strong a word.”106 Importantly, the 
owners understood that the labor unrest and the competition between lines cut into their 
profits.  
The railroads did respond to safety and rate concerns. Automatic coupling 
systems and a standardized gauge of four feet 8½ inches had come into being by 1880 
and four time zones in 1883 (from fifty-four).107 Also steel rails replaced iron rails, which 
permitted larger capacity freight cars to be pulled by heavier, more fuel efficient 
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locomotives, and there was a drop in the ton/mile rate from 3.09 cents in 1866 to 0.76 
cents in 1886.108  
Demands on the government to act on railroad rates began to mount. Federal 
interest in interstate commerce started with maritime commerce. In 1824, in Gibbons v. 
Ogden, the Supreme Court ruled that only the federal government could regulate 
interstate commerce.109   Nonpayment of loans by the railroads led the government to 
pass the Thurman Law in 1874 and to create a Bureau of Railroad Accounts.110  
Congressional interest in the railroads was justified by their importance in 
unifying the nation as the country grew, especially in the period after the Civil War. The 
huge public investment in their creation and the fact that the transit lines came to be seen  
as natural monopolies, like other public services provided further justification.111 In past 
histories, private capital was often cited as the only economic driver of the lines, but the 
facts show many lines were financed by local and state bonds and subsidies.112 As early 
as 1830 there were drawbacks on duties on imported railroad iron, and total exemptions 
from 1832 until 1842.113 Also, the federal government had provided support for the 
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railways by land grants totaling 131,230,358 acres (enough to form the third largest state) 
and the Federal government provided direct loans or stipends per mile of track laid for 
many of the lines.114 Additionally, Congress provided financial support through the mail 
contracts, which were worth hundreds of thousands of dollars to mail carriers.115 
Indirectly, the construction of the railways was promoted by reductions of the import 
tariffs for rails.116 Therefore, there was an interest in how the train systems performed.   
After the decline of the Grangers, merchants, small oil companies and the 
railways themselves (after the failures of pools and the return to competition in the early 
1880s) were the prime movers for reform.117 In 1873, New York farmers and merchants, 
who opposed railroad rate controls with the goal of achieving a rate advantage over their 
competitors, formed the New York Cheap Transportation Association (later the Board of 
Trade and Transportation). They were led by Francis B. Thurber, a grocer and Simon 
Sterne, an attorney. This movement led to the New York’s Hepburn committee of 1879, 
which revealed the rebates paid to Standard Oil and the extent of the watering of the New 
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York Central’s stock. Sterne was chief investigator for New York State and went on to 
help the Senate committee draft the ICA.118    
At the recommendation of President Grant, a Senate committee was appointed to 
study the increasing transportation needs of the West and South in 1872. This committee 
(the “Windom Committee”) produced a report in 1874 that informed legislators and the 
public on railroad problems. Additionally the report recommended that the government 
run a model railroad to serve as a guide to the appropriate rates, a recommendation  never 
acted upon.119 
Under pressure from the independent oil producers from Pennsylvania, the House 
first considered regulation in 1876.  John Reagan, a Democratic Congressman from 
Texas and longtime chair of the Committee on Commerce, was responsible for a bill that 
passed in the House in 1878. It was based on an earlier bill introduced by James Hopkins 
(of Pennsylvania) and contained provisions requiring railroads to post schedules. It 
contained anti-rate discrimination provisions (anti-rebating provisions and prohibition on 
higher rates for short vs. long hauls) and opposed pooling.  However, his bill failed in the 
Senate. He continued to introduce modifications of the bill throughout the early 1880s. 
Shelby Cullom, a Republican senator from Illinois introduced a bill with more flexible 
long-short haul rate differentials but left enforcement to a commission. Cullom’s bill, 
which did not deal with pooling, passed the Senate in 1886.120 Following the Wabash 
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decision of 1886, a compromise bill creating the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) was 
passed.121 The major points of contention in reaching the compromise was over the 
creation of a commission with advisory vs. legal powers, a long-short clause and  
the issue of pools.122 President Cleveland signed the bill into law in 1887.123 There was 
no provision for rate regulation in the bills as proposed, or in the law that was passed.  
 The ICA was created with bipartisan support, primarily from Midwestern 
Republicans and Southern Democrats (opposition came from pro-railroad Northeastern  
Republicans, and those Democrats who supported a more stringent bill).124 There was 
little opposition and actually some half-hearted support from the railroads, which saw 
railroad regulation as inevitable and the bill as the best that the railroads were likely to 
do.125 Five of the Northeastern Republicans who voted against the bill had been railroad 
presidents; one of the two California senators who opposed the bill was Leland Stanford 
of the Southern Pacific Railroad.126   
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Twenty-four sections were included in the ICA.127 In summary, the Act: 1) 
established the ICC with the authority “to inquire into the management of the business of 
all common carriers“ and with the obligation to make yearly reports to the Secretary of 
the Interior; 2) the ICC was to consist of five commissioners, with a term of six years, 
and no more than three from one political party; none was to have a connection with the 
railroad industry; 3) it granted the Commission the right to receive complaints and 
investigate violations of statute; in order to accomplish this the Commission had the 
power to require witnesses to testify and the power to require production; and 4) the Act 
stated that rates for transportation should be reasonable; 5) it banned preferential  
rates or rebates for shippers; 6) differential rates for short vs. long hauls were forbidden 
except “in special cases after investigation by the Commission;” 7) the Act outlawed 
pooling of traffic or earnings; 8) public posting and filing of rates and ten days notice of 
increase in rates was required; 9) contracts and agreements between common carriers 
were to be filed with the Commission.  The ICA required 10) the filing of annual reports 
from all common carriers covering financial issues, rates and regulation, contracts and 
agreements, and 11) “if practical” that all carriers use a uniform accounting system. Most 
importantly, 12) the Act applied only “to any common carrier or carriers engaged in the 
transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad” 
between or across states or with a foreign country. Intrastate commerce was specifically 
not covered by the Act.128  Power to set rates was not a function of the ICC. Enforcement 
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of ICC judgments was a power reserved for the circuit court of the United States.  While 
a goal of the ICC was to try to set up uniform accounting, issues of stock manipulation 
were not addressed. Initially, the Secretary of the Interior had a degree of formal control 
over the commission with authority to approve employment and compensation for 
employees, to furnish offices, and approve expenses. The Secretary was to transmit the 
commission’s annual reports to the Congress.129 From the very beginning the intention of 
the Act was unclear; it was very difficult to determine its goal; its terms were confusing  
and contradictory; some provisions stimulated competition while others penalized it.130  
 Thomas Cooley was the commission’s first chairman. Cooley was well-known 
nationally as a respected Constitutional scholar and a proponent of laissez-faire business 
economics. He was described as a “distinguished jurist” and “Michigan’s most illustrious 
judge.”131 
This is the background that led to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the 
Interstate Commerce Commission that it created as it is typically presented. It should be 
noted that while this is a railroad-specific history, a similar background exists for many 
other industries that have since come under the control of commissions. Their histories 
may differ in details, but they would be the same in essence.  This picture of the origin of 
the ICC emphasizes pressures on Congress from socially, economically, and industrially 
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motivated interest groups, occurring at a time when the states did not have the ability to 
control rail transportation in response to these pressures. The states were unable to 
enforce their own laws and the federal courts limited their ability to expand their power 
declaring that the states could not deal with the important issues of interstate commerce, 
which was ruled to be in the Federal domain in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway  
Company v. Illinois 118 U. S. 557 (1886).132 The situation was compounded by the  
complex needs of the railroads and the lack of Congressional expertise in this area.133 
This is a view of the origin of the ICC that suggests the Act was passed primarily in an 
attempt to respond to societal pressures and pressures of voting blocs. For many this is 
the standard picture of the origin of the ICC. However, it should be noted that there are 
multiple objections to this picture. A major issue is that the actual state of the railroads 
and the “pressure groups” in the period prior to the passage of the ICA is ignored. Also 
the benefits and value of the railroads are often ignored and business practices are viewed 
from a mid 20th-century perspective.134 The primary objection is that the goals of the 
1870s that created the pressure for railway regulation were less evident by the late 1880s. 
As noted, by that time the Grange had ceased to have significant political influence and 
shipping rates for farmers and merchants had fallen. Oilmen who had initially opposed 
rebates to Standard Oil had joined with Standard Oil to share in the rebates. On their own 
the railways had improved safety and operating efficiency and started on the road to 
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consolidation.  Not only was railroad technology and management more complicated at 
the end of the 1880s but similar changes were taking place in virtually every industry. 
Despite Kolko’s hypothesis, most scholars of the ICA do not see the railroads as its  
advocates; railroad line acceptance of the ICA was at best limited.135 Even some of the 
brief reviews indicate that many of the actions of the entrepreneurs of the lines “revealed 
slight consciousness of social responsibility” rather than outright criminal actions.136 For 
these reasons other approaches to the story of the ICC’s origin are needed.     
 
 
Origin of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the United States Supreme Court 
The ICC is often presented as the result of the Granger movement, pressure from  
wholesalers and Eastern merchants or the result of the internecine conflicts in the 
providers of the rail services. However there is evidence that the ICC was also the 
inevitable result of the unfolding of mechanisms that were put into motion at the onset of 
the foundation of the American Republic, and the inevitable consequence of Article One, 
Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution in which the power to regulate 
Interstate Commerce is reserved to the Congress. The Clause was about creating a unified 
nation through interconnected national markets and strengthening the federal 
government. Congress was given the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, 
and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”137 That power has played a very 
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important role in the expansion of Federal power to this day.138 The Commerce Clause 
was first used as early as 1824 to regulate interstate navigation, but it became of even 
greater importance as interstate commerce and trade vastly increased with the growth of 
the railway systems after the Civil War. The ICA and ICC can be viewed as the result of 
the Commerce Clause.  
  To discover the original intent of the Commerce Clause, events arising from the 
failure of the Articles of Confederation that led to the framing of the Constitution must be 
considered.  
1) The lack of a strong central government to balance the authority of the state 
governments. 
 
2) After the end of the Revolution the nation’s unity was threatened by weaknesses 
in the central government under the Articles of Confederation. These weaknesses 
were especially apparent in the area of regulation of interstate commerce. Conflict 
arose between the states over state taxation of goods crossing state lines in transit 
to other states and conflicts over control of waterways that bordered on two or 
more states.139 Attempts to rectify the situation led to the Virginia Convention and 
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the US Constitution—to an extent, the Constitution came into being as a result of 
interstate commerce.140 
 
3) “[C]ommerce, taxation and the militia,” and promotion of national unity were 
seen by Madison (Federalist, no. 56) as the most important objectives of Federal 
legislation.  
 
       The “founders” original intent of the Commerce Clause can be found in three  
 
      sources.  
  
 The first is the Constitution itself with its primary intent of forming, a “more 
perfect union.” According to Max Farrand, the fundamental objection to government 
under the Articles of Confederation was its inability to enforce its degrees. This objection 
was remedied by the Constitution by the creation of the “supreme Law of the Land” with 
“the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union.” The Constitution “came about that in 
place of opposition or distrust, commercial confidence caused welcome and support to be 
extended to the new government…it was floated on a wave of commercial prosperity.”141 
Second, the Federalist Papers (Madison and Hamilton) and records of the Federal  
Convention are the primary sources that provide insight into the original intent of the  
Constitution’s framers.142  In Federalist 42, Madison states that the goal of the Clause is  
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“supervising …reciprocal trade of confederated states” so that “they shall not establish 
imposts disadvantageous to their neighbors …without general permission,” an idea 
supported by Monroe.143 From this, it is clear that an original intent of the Commerce 
Clause was the control of interstate tariffs on trade.144 
 The third source of original intent is the actions of the founding fraternity. Power 
was in the hands of Federalists—the advocates of a strong central government. When 
Adams lost his bid for re-election in 1800 to Jefferson (the leading advocate of limited 
government) he spent his last days in office trying to preserve Federalist ideals through 
his appointment of judges.145 His greatest success was his “11:50” appointment—John 
Marshall—a moderate Federalist who believed in a strong judiciary and the primacy of 
the federal government over the states; according to John Adams: “John Marshall was my 
gift to the American People.”146 The Federalist’s beliefs were to shape Marshall’s view of 
the Constitution and its development. 
 The Constitution established a tripartite system of government —it established the 
three branches of government, which were meant to balance each other. Roles, powers 
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and spheres of influence for each branch were outlined in Articles 1-3, but the specifics 
of power sharing needed to be worked out.147 In this light Marshall’s goal was to assert as 
much power for the judiciary as he could; if no one challenged his authority all the better 
for the courts. This was accomplished in Marbury v.Madison,1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 
(1803) where both judicial review and the principle that the Court could define and 
interpret the terms of the Constitution enabled the Court to create law (previously 
accepted by the framers as “an unwritten” or implied power). It was established under the  
premise that the Court’s duty to judge gave it the right to interpret constitutionality.148   
Marbury was followed by Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (10 U.S.) 87 (1810), where, 
for the first time, the Supreme Court reversed a state court.149   
 In Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton (22 U.S.) 1 (1824) Marshall provided the  
government with the tool to exercise the power he had secured for it.150 Ogden had been 
granted a New York state license to operate a steamship between New York and New 
Jersey and he sued Gibbons under a federal statue when Gibbons tried to operate a 
competing line. Marshall’s court ruled in favor of Gibbons under the Commerce Clause.  
Marshall’s ruling was based on Webster’s argument in the case.151 Marshall’s ruling 
broadly defined three elements of interstate commerce. Commerce was defined by 
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Marshall to mean not only what was moved, but “commercial intercourse,” which 
included how things were moved, and added the idea of transportation to the Commerce 
Clause via navigation.152 Next, “among the several states” was taken to mean everything 
that was not restricted to the borders of a single state. “Even if an activity was carried on 
entirely within the borders of a single state, if it affected commerce beyond the borders of 
the state is was interstate commerce.”153 Finally the power to regulate commerce was 
defined as a power vested in Congress by the Constitution with no limitations other than 
those specified in the Constitution.154 This approach has been the focus and basis of 
subsequent commentators and interpreters.  For them following Marshall, “commerce” 
had the broad meaning—“all forms of intercourse”/ “gainful activities”—anything that 
impacted on “activities in more states than one.”155  
 For the next sixty years the Clause remained relatively quiescent. Congress did 
not provide legislative guidance based on it, and the courts temporized. Despite this, 
issues of interstate commerce came up in multiple cases.156  
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In Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 12 Howard (53 
U.S.) 299 (1851)—a decision that some see as somewhat antithetical to Gibbons—the 
court under Roger Taney, who followed Marshall as the Chief Justice and was more 
favorable to states’ rights than Marshall had been, recognized concurrent power 
(nonexclusive federal jurisdiction) to regulate local commerce (an idea that conflicted  
with dormant commerce power).157 In this case, the port of Philadelphia sought to enforce 
state pilotage regulations on ships coming into port from various ports of origin. The 
Court found in favor of Philadelphia.  It felt that some rules operated “equally…in every 
port: and some…meet the local necessities of navigation.158 This case pointed to judicial 
strengthening of states’ power. It is reflective of a time in which the Court was becoming 
more conservative and less supportive of federal control over business in the era of 
laissez-faire economics, and the antebellum court that ruled in Dred Scott (the decision 
was written by Chief Justice Taney, who was supported by seven of nine justices).  
States’ rights were also affirmed in so-called Slaughter-House Cases (1873) (The  
Butcher’s Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. The Crescent City Livestock 
Landing and Slaughter-house Company, 83 U.S. 36 [1873] et al.) after the Civil War. 
Here the fourteenth amendment was limited and the states police powers affirmed. It was 
ruled by Justice Miller that to apply the amendment would “constitute the Court a 
perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States on the civil rights of their own 
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citizens,” and thus interfere with licensing acts, liquor regulation, hours of labor, and 
child labor laws.”159 
 In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), the most famous of the Granger Cases, 
Ira Munn a grain elevator operator in Illinois, challenged the state’s authority to regulate 
his business. Under the Granger laws the Illinois Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
claimed the right to regulate railroads, warehouses and grain elevators’ maximum fees.  
Munn argued in part that his business involved interstate commerce, therefore only the 
United States government and not the state of Illinois could regulate it. The Court found 
against him. In its opinion the Court noted that since Congress had not acted to regulate 
grain elevators, Illinois could.160 Similar opinions were expressed in Chicago, Burlington 
and Quincy Railroad v. Iowa, 24 U.S. 94 (1876) and Peik v. Chicago and North Western 
Railway Company, 94 U.S. 164 (1876).161  In both of these cases, the companies did 
business that crossed state lines. Therefore, under the Commerce Clause, they objected to 
state regulations. In Chicago the court accepted that the company was involved in 
interstate commerce but ruled that “until Congress acts, the State must be permitted to 
adopt such rules and regulations as may be necessary… even though in so doing those 
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without may be indirectly affected.”162 The ruling in Peik was virtually identical.163 In 
1880, James B. Weaver, congressman from Iowa and the Greenback party candidate for 
president complained that railroads in Iowa were shifting litigation from state to federal 
courts by incorporating in other states.164  
 Dissenting in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883) in which the Supreme 
Court ruled that the 14th Amendment did not gave Congress the right to outlaw racial 
discrimination by private individuals or organization, Justice John Marshall Harlan 
suggested that under the commerce clause the court “could prohibit discrimination in 
public conveyances passing from one State to another” hinting at a potentially broadened 
view of federal power.165 His view prevailed in the decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel,  
Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964).166 
It is important to review the judicial climate of the second half of the 19th century. 
One of the most important books of this era was: A Treatise on the Constitutional 
Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union, 
written in 1868 by Thomas M. Cooley, who was to be the first chief commissioner of the 
ICC. This work provided the legal ideological underpinnings for the laissez-faire point of 
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view; it was often cited by the conservative court of this time. It championed limited 
government, opposed hostile business regulation, and opposed laws favoring “organized 
labor and the mob.”167 
           Interest in the Clause increased from 1886. Afterwards, the Clause was to become  
more disputed and generate “more cases than any other.”168 
In 1886, after long supporting states’ rights, the Supreme Court emphasized the  
jurisdiction of the federal government over the states in the area of interstate transport in  
Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railroad Company v. Illinois citing the Clause, 118 U. S. 
557 (1886).169 It is often stated that this case led to the enactment of the Interstate 
Commerce Act of 1887, which established the first regulatory commission (limited to 
control of the railroads). In 1890, justified by the Commerce Clause, Congress passed the 
Sherman Antitrust Act. The ICC and Sherman Antitrust acts were both innovations. It 
would seem that issues of interstate commerce could have been raised in the “Erie War” 
of 1853-1854, which dealt with connecting railroad gauges on interstate transport and the 
franchise granting to railroads chartered in out-of-state jurisdictions in the 1840s.170 The 
ICC was to increase regulation of industry by an administrative agency; the Sherman act 
was to control the growing industries by legislation. Neither was successful at first.  
This review of the history of the Commerce Clause and Supreme Court indicates 
that the ICA was long predestined. It was the consequence of the battle between the states 
                                                     
167 Friedman, A History of American Law, 545-546. 
 
168 Forte, “Commerce among the States, 101, 102. Farnsworth, An Introduction to 
the Legal System, 166. 
 
169 Arnheim, U. S. Constitution for Dummies, 86. 
 
 170 Ely, Railroads and American Law, 13-16. 
  
52 
 
and central Government not only over commerce, but over the balance of power between 
the states and the federal government. The outcome was predetermined in the 
Constitution and early decisions of John Marshall. Therefore, it is my contention that the 
ICC was established in the context not only of social, political and economic trends, but 
as a result of a judicial current originating in the Constitution and in the original 
Federalist agenda, which had been set into motion by John Marshall. An issue for future 
research that should be addressed is the Court’s delay in reaching a decision to force 
Congress to address the implications of the Commerce Clause.  They could have reached 
the same conclusions in any of the cases cited from the 1870s, all of which brought  
up the Commerce Clause. The interaction of the Court, the railroads and ICC was 
important as a vehicle whereby the public could shape business ethics and morality. 
Through the federal Courts it was decided that some of the cornerstones of the lassiez-
faire business model were illegal, while the court of public opinion and the press that 
judged them eventually found them to be immoral. 
 
The Origins of the Interstate Commerce Commission; The People Who Created the 
Commission 
Hoogenboom suggested that looking at what congressmen said and “tallying their 
votes” is a way to achieve better understanding of the forces that led Congress to pass the 
ICA.171 The ICA and hence the ICC both came into being mainly through the efforts of 
two men, John H. Reagan and Shelby M. Cullom, though numerous other politicians 
lawmakers played supporting roles.  Because of this it is important to understand the 
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beliefs, politics, and affiliations that led these men to write and pass the ICA. It is also 
important to the understanding of their goals for the ICC.   
 Legislative interest in the railroads began as early as 1868. The idea of a federal 
railroad bureau appeared in the 1871 Cook bill.  A federal commission to gather 
information for railroad legislation was proposed in the 1873 Hawley bill. A bill by 
George McCray (a Republican from Iowa), which called for reasonable rates and a 
commission passed the House, but failed in the Senate in 1874.172 At President Grant’s 
request, a Senate committee investigated rates and produced the “Windom report” in 
1874, which was never acted upon.173 James H. Hopkins was a Democratic Congressman 
from Pennsylvania. He called for an investigation into the billing of Standard Oil in 1876 
and introduced a bill to prohibit rebates and discriminatory billing, provide for court 
enforcement of regulation and the posting of train schedules. This bill was  
reputedly drawn up by the counsel for the Reading Railroad (a line that did not get 
Standard’s traffic). When Hopkins failed to get re-elected in 1877 he urged John H. 
Reagan, the new chairman of the Commerce Committee to pursue federal regulation (a 
fact not mentioned by Reagan in his Memoirs). Another Pennsylvania Congressman, 
Lewis F. Watson, passed a version of Hopkins’ measure in 1878.174  
John H. Reagan (1818-1905) has been called one of the four most prominent 
Texans of the 19th century. Reagan was an Indian fighter, lawyer, judge, and U. S. 
Congressman prior to the American Civil War. Before the war, he campaigned and won 
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his Congressional seat from Texas on a pro-Union platform.  Nevertheless he resigned his 
seat in Congress in January of 1861 following Texas’ secession from the Union. He was 
one of the representatives from Texas to go to the secession convention in Montgomery, 
Alabama, and within a month was a member of the cabinet of Jefferson Davis as his 
Postmaster General.  In this role he was a noteworthy success. Reagan convinced most of 
the southern members of the United States Post Office to join him and he had the 
Confederate Postal Service up and running within six weeks—performing the “minor  
miracle in keeping the Confederate Post Office Department on the profit side of the 
Ledger.”175 He accomplished this by abolishing free-franking of mail, raising postal rates, 
eliminating costly routes, increasing staff efficiency, and increasing competition.  Also, 
he convinced railroad executives to cut transportation rates in half and accept 
Confederate bonds for payment.176 Although there was some public dissatisfaction with 
him, Reagan remained Confederate Post Master General through the war and was even 
appointed the Sectary of the Treasury of the Confederacy for a short time towards the end 
of the war.  
After the war Reagan antagonized many of his fellow Texans when he wrote his 
Fort Warren Letter. In it he advocated that they accept the regulations laid down by the 
North to avoid harsher repercussions—“the complete subjugation and humiliation of the 
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Southern people.”177 In 1866 he declined to accept the appointment to be Governor of 
Texas offered by General Charles Griffin, the Union commander of the Department of 
Texas. When his predictions were proven right and more “violent measures of 
reconstruction were adopted,” he was returned to favor and the U. S. Congress in 1875.178 
Reagan was a member of the Texas Constitution convention in 1876. 
 As a member of the 44th Congress, Reagan was appointed to the Committees on 
Commerce and on Expenditures of the Post Office Department and states that he realized 
“the necessity of improving the commercial facilities of my State.”179 He devoted “much 
labor” to a bill concerning steam vessel commerce and regulation in 1876, only to be  
opposed by railroad interests. 180 On May 8, 1878, Reagan introduced his bill “to regulate 
interstate commerce and to prohibit unjust discrimination by common carriers” for the 
first time (as noted above he does not mention Hopkins).181 Despite being approached to 
run for governor of Texas in July of 1878 he chose to remain in Congress to advocate for 
his bill until its final passage in 1887. Reagan and his supporters ardently opposed pools 
and the idea of a commission; they wanted rates to be posted, a provision for equal 
mileage rates and they looked to ordinary court process for enforcement of the law with 
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high penalties for violation.182 Surprisingly, in his Memoir, Reagan does not mention the 
events that surrounded the ultimate passage of the ICA or Shelby M. Cullom, perhaps 
because of the compromises necessary to pass the bill.  
 After serving as chairman of the House Commerce Committee for ten years, 
Reagan was elected to the Senate and served on the Commerce Committee of the Senate 
for four years.  Resigning from his seat in the Senate in June of 1891, and in support of 
his friend Governor Hogg’s campaign pledge to regulate railroads, Reagan went on to 
spend the remainder of his public life as chairman of the Texas state Railroad 
Commission. When Reagan took over the commission, Texas ended a decade as the 
epicenter of the American railroad boom. During this period over six thousand miles of 
track had been laid in the state and towns and cities were expanding. Texas, with six  
railroads, went from ten thousand to nearly forty thousand miles of track.183 This 
commission was able to value the railroads in order to control the stocks and bonds and 
prevent “watering.” It could also “regulate, and maintain freight rates and passenger 
fares, requiring all rates to be reasonable and just, which discouraged rebating and 
pooling, leading to constant growth in the business [and net revenues] of the roads.” 184 
Reagan was also named in two cases in which the Supreme Court affirmed the rights of 
the Texas Commission to regulate its own intrastate roads: Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan and 
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Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894) and Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Co, 154 U.S. 413 
(1894).185  
 The career of Shelby M. Cullom (1829-1914) had a hardly less distinguished than 
that of Reagan. Cullum studied law (briefly under the tutelage of Abraham Lincoln) and 
was admitted to the bar in 1855, the year he was elected to his first public office, city 
attorney of Springfield, Illinois.  In 1856 he was elected to the Illinois House of 
Representatives and served as its speaker in 1861 (first as a Whig, then as a Republican). 
He was defeated in a bid for the Illinois State Senate in 1862, the year Lincoln appointed 
him to a commission to investigate the Quartermaster’s and Commissary Departments. 
From 1865 until 1871 Cullom served as a congressman from Illinois in the U. S. House 
of Representatives. He served in the Illinois House, again as Speaker, from 1873 to 1874. 
In 1876 and in 1880 he was elected Governor of Illinois.  He served as governor until 
1883.  In 1877, as Governor of Illinois, he took part in suppressing the Great Railroad 
Strike of 1877.  
 When Cullom was in the Illinois House in 1873 he was appointed to a committee 
that addressed the fact that the existing railroad regulation was ineffective and under the 
existing laws the railroad commission had no power.  That committee drafted the 
Railroad and Warehouse Law of 1873. Stringent state regulation is said to begin with this 
law.  It set up a board of commissioners who set maximum passenger rates, provided 
freight rates based entirely on distance and prepared a schedule of minimum freight 
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rates.186 As Governor, in 1879, he defended the Law and in his autobiography presented 
his experiences with regulation of rail transportation and the associated warehouses.187 
He found that railroads in Illinois were overbuilt and forced to compete. Competition 
forced lines to lose money at points of competition. In order to compensate, rates were 
raised where there was less competition. The State of Illinois tried to correct the rate 
discrimination and protect the rights of individuals by the passage of laws and formation 
of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission. The authority of the Commission (after it 
was recognized by the U. S. Supreme Court) “put an end to many of the abuses formerly 
practiced by such corporations.”188 As a result Cullom concluded that the railroads should 
manage their own affairs and rates “free from meddlesome legislation…as long as they 
show a reasonable regard for the requirements of the community.”189 This is the same 
conclusion that, according to Cullom, had been reached in England.  
 Cullom’s background of having been governor of Illinois, one of the states most 
influenced by the Grangers, with one of the strongest state commissions was important in 
shaping his views. He saw the benefits that came from the State Commission in the 
development of fulltime “students of the great subject of transportation,” the gathering of 
statistics and dealing with safety. In Illinois the Commissioners acted as dispute 
arbitrators.190 Cullom recognized that Commissioners needed to be given more legal 
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authority, that there were limitations on what the states could control and he recognized 
the Constitutional authority of the federal government in interstate commerce.191 This 
was Cullom’s background when he entered the Senate.   
Governor Cullom resigned from his office in 1883 in order to become the U. S. 
Senator from Illinois.192  When Cullom entered the Senate he had three objectives: 
control of Interstate Commerce in order “to protect the individual rights of the people as 
against the great railroad corporations,” obliteration of polygamy in Utah and the 
Hennepin Canal.193 (The Hennepin Canal was built to connect the Illinois and Mississippi 
Rivers and compete with rail service. It was obsolete even before it was completed in 
1907.)194 Senator Cullom introduced a bill for a railroad commission in 1883 that was 
less stringent than Reagan’s bill. It proposed a federal commission and accepted pooling 
under the supervision of the commission.195 Despite an adverse report from the Senate 
Commerce Committee it passed the Senate in January of 1885. A special Senate 
committee, chaired by Cullom, was established in 1885 to help to break the deadlock 
between the House and Senate bills.196  After investigating the railways, and over 2000 
pages of testimony, the committee reported back to the Senate.  It was unanimously 
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agreed that there are “evils” in the transportation system. Cullom’s commission found 
eighteen causes of complaint, “the paramount evil…is unjust discrimination between 
persons, places, commodities or particular descriptions of traffic” to be rectified by 
“redress and enforcement punishment, and…publicity as to the rates, financial operations  
and methods of management.”197  Federal intervention to correct the “evils” of the 
transportation industry was deemed necessary, according to the report, to protect the 
interest of those discriminated against, especially the small shipper, because the problem 
was too big and beyond the jurisdiction of the states.198 The report notes, somewhat 
ambiguously: 
 [t]hat a problem of such magnitude, importance, and intricacy can be summarily 
 solved by any masterstroke of legislative reason is beyond the bound of 
 reasonable belief…That a satisfactory solution of the problem can ever be secured 
 without the aid of wise legislation the committee does not believe.199 
 
 The report also raises a question of the “evil” intent of the carriers: 
 
 [t]he first question to be determined, apparently, is whether the inequalities 
 complained of and admitted to exist are inevitable, or whether they are entirely 
 the result of arbitrary and unnecessary discrimination on the part of the common 
 carriers of the country.200  
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 The resulting focus of the bill that Cullom presented was clearly on rate 
discrimination and not on other forms of financial manipulation. This bill was passed by 
the Senate in 1886. Cullom, in his autobiography, is laudatory and expansive about the 
members of the Senate committee who researched and wrote the bill. However, his 
description of Reagan’s role and the House bill is terse and he does not mention the role 
of Simon Sterne in working with the Senate committee.201   
The major issues of contention between the House and the Senate bill were the  
appointment of a commission, the long-short haul rates and the anti-pooling section.202 
Pressure on the Congress increased when the Supreme Court decided the Wabash case. 
As a result a compromise on the two bills was reached. Cullom got the Commission, 
subject to judicial appeal, rather than direct judicial control, but lost on the issues of pools 
and long-short haul rate control.203 As late as 1913 Cullom expressed his doubts about the 
anti-pooling section.204  
Cullom continued to serve as a U. S. Senator until 1913, serving on the 
Committee on Interstate Commerce (where he tried to introduce a bill strengthening the 
ICC, a progenitor of the Hepburn Act) and the Foreign relations Committee. During this 
time period he was noted for attempting to pass a bill excluding Utah from statehood 
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based on polygamy and was appointed to the commission to establish the government of 
the Territory of Hawaii by President McKinley. Shelby Cullom died in 1914.  
In the Senate, Cullom’s bill was adopted with thirty-seven yes votes and twelve 
no votes; twenty-six Senators (including many  of the most “bitter” opponents of 
regulation) were absent.205 Senators from the northeast and west coast generally opposed 
the bill, which they felt would jeopardize their region’s competitive position and 
bankrupt or unduly restrict railway growth.206 Midwesterners were generally supportive 
of the bill, primarily based on their opposition to the power of the railroads. While there 
was bipartisan support for the bill Republicans from the northeast and Democrats who 
opposed the Republicans and supported the earlier and more restrictive Reagan bill, 
opposed the compromise bill.207  
 Finally, President Grover Cleveland’s opinions about the ICA must be 
considered.  According to Hoogenboom, President Cleveland signed the ICA with some 
hesitation.208  However, Cullom, Graff, and Jeffers all indicate his backing for the ICA 
and active lobbying in support of its passage.209 Cleveland was known for his strict 
interpretation of the constitution, support of a laissez-faire approach to business and 
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favoring government arbitration over intervention. At the same time he is famous for his 
campaign against protective tariffs, which he felt overcharged consumers and favored  
special interests.210 While governor of New York, Cleveland opposed a fare rate increase 
by Jay Gould’s Manhattan Elevated Railroad; nevertheless he vetoed the bill that would 
have lowered the rate on the grounds that the bill was unconstitutional.211  Likewise, as 
president, he famously opposed the Texas Seed Bill of 1887, stating, “I can find no 
warrant for such an appropriation in the Constitution…though the people support the 
Government, the Government should not support the people.”212 In response to the  
Southwest Strike of 1886, Cleveland recommended legislation for arbitrating labor 
disputes and advocated for a government “which dealt even handedly with capital and  
labor”213 (although Cleveland was later criticized as being less than even handed in his 
actions in the Pullman Strike).214 The passage of the ICA and creation of the ICC, which 
led to an increased role for government, was clearly constitutional.  Pafford suggests that 
Cleveland may have felt that the ICA struck a balance between the exploitation by 
business monopolies and government intervention.215 The lack of firm and enforceable 
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goals by a commission without judicial power was in line with Cleveland’s beliefs and 
the beliefs of the man he chose to be the commission’s first commissioner, Thomas  
Cooley, with the support of Senator Cullom.216 
In consideration of the motives of those involved in the passage of the ICA 
several themes emerge. The first is that many of the Congressmen involved responded to 
their constituents, be they the oil producers, agriculturalists, merchants, shippers of raw 
and finished materials, or railroad magnates and voted for, or against, the bill merely to 
placate them or because of their limited knowledge of the issues at hand.217 For them the 
ICC was simply a means to placate public opinion. As a result, from its inception the ICC 
was not “particularly fierce” and “born to be crippled.” 218  However, other members of 
the Senate obviously had much stronger feelings. Pro-railroad Congressmen (and the 
railroads), despite Kolko’s thesis, either voted against the bill or were absent from the 
voting.219 On the other hand, several Congressmen who opposed the lines were opposed 
to the bill as not strong enough. 
When Cullom first came to Washington and was appointed to the Senate 
Committee on Railroads it was a non-working committee. His experience and interest in 
railway regulation energized the committee. For Cullom, the motivation was his goal of 
protecting individuals from the discriminatory practices of the corporations. Based on his 
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familiarity with the issues, he favored a regulatory commission that would arbitrate 
conflicts between the parties, and he did not oppose pooling. His view was that given 
time and encouragement backed by the power of legal pressure, the commission could 
encourage the rail lines to self-correct. This belief was probably a view that President 
Cleveland shared. It may explain the original structure of the ICA and ICC. Both shared 
the view that the federal government had the obligation to deal with the issues of  
interstate commerce.   
 Finally, while Reagan was said to be a Unionist even prior to the Civil War, 
above all Reagan remained a loyal Texan, Southerner, and defender of states’ rights—
“the late Confederates were not rebels nor traitors; in their attempt to withdraw from the 
Union they were guided and animated by the purest and most exalted patriotism and  
justified in their actions by the Constitution of the United States.”220 Reagan’s interests 
that led to the ICA were a combination of state interest and his understanding that the 
post-Civil War recovery of the state of Texas was connected to its role as a transportation 
and commerce hub within the United States. He exhibited a progressive rather than a 
populist approach in that he favored an agency based on “a staff of experts” in order to 
investigate and understand problems. Rational compromise and cooperation, not 
confrontation was the key approach of the Commission.221 However, the ability to 
maintain control of the railroads within Texas was vital to him.  Still, there is little doubt 
that he believed that the destiny of Texas was to be part of the United States.222  
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  Robert Cushman has noted that when Cullom—the activist for commissions— 
was Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives he took an active interest in the 
Illinois Railroad and Warehouse Commission. Cushman also noted that Reagan, who 
opposed the creation of a federal commission, came from Texas, which was a state that 
had no railroad commission in 1887.223 
Typical histories of the ICC focus on Reagan and Cullom, rarely mentioning 
those who advocated for regulation of the carriers before them. Yet this review shows 
that while they may have turned out to be the prime movers in the passage of the ICA, the 
movement to regulate the railways was under way before either arrived in Washington. 
While this review may not totally explain the motivations behind each group or 
individual, it does indicate that all concerned agreed regulation was an idea whose time 
had come. They voted for an agency of limited power, either because they felt that the 
guidance of an agency would work by persuasive influence and thereby change the 
workings of the railways, or because, through lack of experience, they had no better idea. 
The result was that the ICC with its vague mandate and no power of enforcement. 
 
Origins of the Interstate Commerce Commission; Railroad Fraud and Finance 
 In addition to dealing with rate discrimination the ICC also had limited power to 
monitor the financial workings and management of the railways. Rate discrimination has 
already been addressed. In this section a review of railroad financing will be presented 
followed by a discussion of railroad mismanagement and corruption. It should be noted 
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that most authors of books on the ICC follow Stone in asserting rampant abuses of the 
railroads, but cite few specific examples. Those who write railroad histories are much 
more sympathetic to the entrepreneurs who built the roads. As a generalization, abuse and 
fraud in the initial building and financing of the railroads set the stage for later rate 
discrimination. This happened due to the duplication of main lines and creation branch 
lines that could not be supported by the volume of available traffic. 224   
Railroad financing got off to a shaky start and in this regard it was very similar to 
the early financing of canals and turnpikes. Despite the success of the Erie Canal, “most 
of these early navigation projects were spectacular failures expending vast sums of public 
and private money with little or nothing to show for it” and destroying the credit of state 
bonds. 225 According to Holbrook, the stocks and bonds of the early railroads traded with 
little regard for their actual worth, making it more profitable to build the railroads then it 
later was to run them.226 Most of the capital used to finance the earliest railways came 
from local sources. For example, in the early 1850s nearly 6000 Wisconsin farmers had 
invested in railroad stock. They raised the money needed to buy the stock by mortgaging 
their farms.227 It has already been noted that the farmers were frequently the stockholders 
in the companies that they were so critical of, and as such they were vulnerable to the 
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financial manipulations of the companies’ managers.228 Investors in the lines likely 
expected two benefits. First they expected benefits to their own enterprises by more 
accessible, faster, and cheaper transportation and they expected safe and profitable 
returns on their investments.229 There is little doubt the first goal was achieved (whatever 
discrimination they faced, the rail transport was, without doubt, more reliable, faster, and 
cheaper than any other form of transport), but often they were disappointed in the second 
goal. As Chief Justice Jeremiah S. Black noted in Sharpless and Others v. Mayor of 
Philadelphia 21 Pa. 147 (1853): “The dividends…have disappointed stockholders. Not  
one of the completed railroads in this state has uniformly paid interest on its cost.”230 
Undoubtedly the financial mismanagement of the lines biased the way in which 
shareholders viewed the carriers. 
 The story of the financing of the Brownville Railroad Corporation (a fictitious, 
but typical early American line) is told by Holbrook and repeated by Wolmar.  After the 
need for a railroad was established (or created) and a charter obtained, the task of 
financing the road began. Like the canals and turnpikes before them, the railroads were 
financed locally by the sale of stock and/or bonds to local businessman, mine owners, 
farmers, “widows and old men, and guardians of fools and minors.”231  Shares were 
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offered through printed prospectus, the press (with editorial support), through direct 
personal appeal, under the authority of the pulpit and via the great American institution of  
the public meeting.232 This private financing had some success in the financing of the 
early roads, which were short lines with guaranteed customers, such as those lines 
between New York and Washington and between the coal mines.233 In 1850, the  
longest and most expensive line connected Albany and Worcester. It cost $8 million.234 
 Stocks were the preferred investment vehicle in the early New England lines. 
Stocks had the advantage of giving investors some say in the running of the lines, but 
were seen as risky because of uncertain returns and abuse potential.  A major issue with 
stocks is that they usually had only a very limited local market and had to be 
supplemented by other securities.235  Frequently, stocks could be bought for a fraction of 
their face value by the directors of the lines who then issued bonds that were sold to 
investors. The bonds gave the directors control of all decisions related to the construction 
and management of the line. They made money on construction, leasing equipment, 
terminals, and right-of-way.236  Bonds were perceived to be safer to the investor. 
Investors preferred to exchange voting rights for the guaranteed returns (however, bonds 
also had the potential for abuse). As a result, investor preference between stocks and 
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bonds varied over the course of the history of rail system financing.237  Early on the 
bonds were secured by governments. By 1837 more than two hundred lines were built 
(often poorly) or conceived, with no overall plan and undercapitalization.238 
 When the rail lines failed to be profitable, the states would attempt to default on 
their bond obligations (as in the case Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wallace 175, 206-207 
[1864], often with the help of state supreme courts). “Railroad-bond cases were very 
much a staple of the [Supreme] Court’s business during the 1860s and 1870s” according 
to Judge Rehnquist. .239  
By the 1850s local financing was rarely adequate for the major projects. Distant  
financing from the major bankers in America and Europe were solicited primarily 
through bankers first in Philadelphia (often through Nicholas Biddle who was the 
president of the Second Bank of the United States), then in Boston, and finally in New 
York (which ultimately became the finance capital of the country, because of the 
investment market in railroad and municipal securities).240  At the same time railroad 
bonds were marketed directly to “specialists” in the marketing of railroad securities in 
British, French, German, Swiss and Dutch importing houses.241 These Europeans were 
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well established in conservative financial houses with access to advice and in contact 
with American Bankers and railway consultants.242 London had become the primary 
European market for all the bonds, which were often issued in sterling and payable in 
London starting in the late 1820s.243  
 Compared to 1½ per cent securities usually offered in London, the 5 to 10 percent 
American securities were very attractive.244 At that time Baring Brothers and Co. became 
one of the major London banks dealing with America. It dealt with multiple state issues 
of securities including those that went towards railway finance. Even prior to 1850 many 
American lines were partially English owned.245 London bankers not only sold securities, 
they also arranged financing for purchases of iron rails and made direct loans to the  
lines.246 The bankers who marketed the bonds were also investors who bought the 
securities and encouraged investment by friends and associates.247 In 1847 the Michigan 
Central issued 8 per cent convertible bonds (short-term interest rates in the late 1840s 
were generally between 6 and 9 per cent); in the 1850s when short-term interest rates 
were above 6 per cent railroad convertible issues of mortgage and construction bonds 
were offered at 7 and 8 percent and they were quickly bought up.248 In the 1870s, short 
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term interest rates ranged from 4 per cent to more than 10 per cent; during this time 
period the more speculative American railroad bonds ranged from 7 to 10 percent on the 
Dutch market while the more solid bonds paid between 5 and 6 per cent.249 The actual 
rates of return on some bonds were higher as the bonds were often sold at sub-par value. 
Like the canals and turnpikes before them many of the proposed lines were never built 
and failed to produce a profit to the financial detriment of their financers.250  
 Europeans even served as directors on American lines in which they held large  
shares.251 Not all railway investors were naïve Americans.252 Sometimes the banker-
investors judged correctly and sometimes not—some of the investments were successful 
and some were not; there were also missed opportunities.253  During the early-mid 19th 
century defaults caused investor losses as well as later in the Panic of 1873.254 The 
majority of these losses in the 1840s were not on railroad securities, but on state issued 
bonds (some of which did fund railway construction). These defaults greatly tainted the 
American market for the European investors.255 In 1847, the English railroad bubble 
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burst, which added to the average English investor’s concern over railroad securities. 
High American yields and 16 per cent discounts by October of 1857 helped the American 
market to recover.256 When there was a default, the bond owners were able to form 
protective committees in order to save as much as possible (American companies were 
not the only ones to default).257 In 1899, despite the “risk,” fraud, and corruption of the 
American railroads, the Dutch had $214 million of investment and the British more.258 
By 1857 England had invested $400 million in American railways. By 1859 American 
rail corporations had floated $1.1 billion worth of bonds.259 In 1868 the English owned 
$1.5 billion and in 1914, $3.1 billion.260 From 1870 to 1880, the decade that included the 
world wide Panic of 1873, American lines paid 9.3 per cent, Indian lines 6.3 per cent, and 
Canadian lines 2.1 per cent.261 Despite their large investments there is no indication that 
foreign investors ever tried to influence government policy towards the railroad. 
Along with private bonds, railways were supported by state and federal 
governments. Governments helped to finance the rail lines by issuing state bonds, 
exclusive charters, tax exemptions, and drawbacks on tariffs and special banking 
privileges.262 Starting in 1850, with the Illinois Central, the federal government began to 
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provide land grants to subsidize construction costs.263  In this manner they maintained 
some control over the location and construction of the roads.264 The notable exception to 
government financing was the self-subsidizing Great Northern Railway, built by James J. 
Hill. 
 The main victims of stock and bond manipulations were the individual, often 
small, investors who (accumulatively) lost millions of dollars when they were caught up 
in the well-documented  financial machinations amongst the major “barons’’ for control 
of the lines. 
  However, the financing of the lines created other vulnerabilities—many of the 
roads were poorly conceived and inappropriately capitalized from the beginning, which 
foredoomed them despite good intentions. Some were overcapitalized, which led to 
corruption, others undercapitalized, which meant they could not be completed. 
Throughout their histories railroads and their shareholders were vulnerable to national 
and foreign financial market fluctuations, bank failures, and instability in foreign political 
affairs that impacted investment.265 Also of note is that the rail lines required new 
technological, financial and management skills. Laws and business practices were in a 
state of flux. What is now illegal was normative business in the 19th century at the high 
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point of laissez-faire economics.266 With this perspective, it has been claimed that 
perhaps most post-Civil War lines inflated costs, involved fraudulent stock manipulation 
and suffered from mismanagement.267 It is not clear how the smaller investor or 
newspapers attributed or understood their losses, or their underlying cause. They often 
falsely attributed their losses to corrupt management. 
 Having addressed the general background of railway finance, instances of major 
abuse and corruptions were well in evidence and some of the more notorious need to be 
presented.  
 After the Civil War the rail system was found to be totally inadequate.  The task 
of rebuilding and growing these roads fell to Northern carpetbaggers, their Southern 
accomplices, and the state governments. In 1868-1869, North Carolina authorized 
$27,850,000 of bonds and actually spent $17,640,000 to build 93 miles of line. The bulk 
of the money was reputedly spent on gambling and bribing state officials.268  
 In Georgia, Hannibal I. Kimball, who was a charismatic carpetbagger, in 
collaboration with Rufus B. Bullock, the governor of the state, received state aid for 
railroads that he never built.269 Corruption existed on multiple levels. When he was 
investigated, a company auditor for the state-owned Western and Atlantic Railroad 
explained that he had saved $30,000 in a year or two, by the “most rigid economy.”270 
                                                     
266 Klein, Unfinished Business, 16-17. Stover, American Railroads, 97-98. 
 
267 Stover, American Railroads, 97. 
 
268 Stover, American Railroads, 98-99. 
 
269 Stover, American Railroads, 99-100. 
 
270 Cited from Stover, American Railroads, 100. 
    
  
76 
 
 The most famous of the stock manipulators/robber barons were “Uncle Daniel” 
Drew, Jim Fisk, Jay Gould, and Commodore and William Vanderbilt. They were famous 
for their stock manipulations of the major lines that ran between New York City and 
Chicago to the detriment of both the lines and investors.  In one of the most publicized 
incidents, the “Erie War,” Fisk, Drew, and Gould sold 100,000 shares of highly 
“watered” Erie stock to Vanderbilt, costing him $7 million and causing Vanderbilt to say 
it “has learned me it never pays to kick a skunk.”271 Of course Vanderbilt was no 
innocent in this “war” in which he matched his opponents bribe for bribe.272 Later, 
proving there was no honor among thieves Gould and Fisk cost Drew $1.5 million and 
his seat on the Erie board of directors through their stock manipulations.273 Fisk and 
Gould were also involved in other schemes, including an attempt to corner and 
manipulate the market for gold (in this case Gould also cheated Fisk, his “partner” in the 
scheme).274 While they were the most notorious stock manipulators, they were not the 
ones to manipulate the capital value of their holdings. In 1869, the Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle reported that twenty-eight railroads increased their capital value 
from $287 million to $400 million in less than two years.275  
Jay Gould was the acknowledged master of stock manipulation. After ruining the 
Erie, Gould was able to take control of the Union Pacific when its stock prices fell in the 
                                                     
271 Cited from Stover, American Railroads, 105. 
       
272 Brands, American Colossus, 29-32. 
 
273 Wolmar, The Great Railroad Revolution, 241-243. 
 
 274 Brands, American Colossus, 34-39. 
 
275 Stover, American Railroads, 102. 
 
  
77 
 
Panic of 1873. He was then able to force the Union Pacific to buy the shares in the 
Kansas Pacific and Denver Pacific. These were shares that he had purchased earlier for a 
few dollars a share and that he sold to the Union Pacific at par value.276 
Unlike others, Jay Gould and both the Commodore and his son also knew how to 
add value to the lines that they controlled. These lines were run effectively and made 
money for the stockholders (even if it meant damning the public).277  In the 1870s when 
short-term interest rates were usually 4 to 6 percent, Vanderbilt’s roads paid dividends of 
6-8 per cent on inflated capitalization.278 
It should be noted that the dividends generally paid on railroad stock could hardly 
be the source of great wealth.  In 1876 the average return on all railroad stock was 3.03% 
and a little more than 2% in 1887. In the 1880s many roads paid no dividends and few 
stocks traded at par.279 In perspective from 1870 until 1890 the short-term interest rates 
ranged from between about 3.5% and 12 % (this included the period of the Panic of 
1873). 
 In defense of the railroad president’s bookkeeping practices, and business ethics, 
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regulations in the late 19th century were in a state of development and flux and far from 
modern standards.280 An issue often faced by the managers was whether to distribute any 
profits as dividends or to reinvest them to maintain and/or upgrade services.281 Technical 
and managerial improvements such as consolidation of service and lines, automatic 
coupling, improved braking systems, the creation of four time zones, and use of steel rails 
all made rail transport cheaper and safer and all were accomplished prior to the ICA, but 
were costly to implement. It should also be noted that even with the discriminatory rates, 
rail transport was most often cheaper than its competitors (again, it was the inequality of 
the rates rather than the rates themselves that were at issue).282  
 The most famous railroad scandal of the 19th century was the Credit Moblier 
Scandal. Before reviewing its history it has to be understood that most of what was done 
was not illegal or atypical of business practices of the times.  The Credit Moblier was “as 
a type of the construction companies which have built most of the railroad mileage in this  
country” (as noted by Cleveland)283 The president of the Union Pacific was a former 
union general, John A. Dix, but it was the vice-president Thomas Durant who decided 
that it would be more profitable to build a railway than to run one and created the Credit 
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Moblier.284 Durant did profess little confidence in the line’s success as an investment, and 
he and his associates sought to profit by its construction, but first he had to get financing.  
The building of the Union Pacific was seen as a major investment risk and there was a 
problem attracting investors.285 To make the venture more attractive Durant first set up a 
company, at first headed by a company employee, with contracts to build the road. He 
arranged for leading shareholders to benefit from the contracts. However, this left the 
shareholders exposed to unlimited liabilities. As a result Durant and associates set up a 
construction company. They bought an idle company in 1864, the Pennsylvania Fiscal 
Agency, and renamed it “Credit Moblier of America” (after a French company, Societe 
Generale de Credit Moblier, a French construction company Durant had been told of by 
George Train, another early promoter of the Union Pacific). Durant then made sure that 
his Credit Moblier got exclusive contracts to build the Union Pacific.286 Credit Moblier 
was to serve multiple functions.  It was to appear as an independent construction 
company that was impartially chosen and it was meant to limit the risk to its investors of 
their investment in the Credit Moblier, since this was not related to the risk of actually 
running the trains. These companies, which usually had railroad directors on their boards, 
were independent entities. Construction companies were the buffers between the railroad 
promoters and those who actually built the lines. They did not actually build anything, 
but they directed the contractors who did the work.  If the costs to build the road were 
excessive, the construction company could go bankrupt but the railroad company would 
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not. This arrangement was typical in the 19th century. It was open to abuse and 
corruption.287  Profit was guaranteed by inflated costs for material and construction. 
Shareholders of the Union Pacific were given the option of trading their shares for Credit 
Moblier shares, or selling their shares to the Union Pacific or Credit Moblier.  At the time 
the Credit Moblier was formed the Union Pacific began to attract New England 
investors.288 The Credit Moblier made money by being paid in stock shares, which could 
then be sold on the open market.  
Conflict between investors over the goals of the Credit Moblier led to the 
involvement of Oliver and Oakes Ames in its management and an eventual compromise 
with Durant. Oakes Ames was a congressman from Massachusetts and he represented the 
company’s interests in Congress. These interests were promoted by the distribution/sale 
of stocks of Credit Moblier to senators and representatives in positions to promote the 
railroads goals by voting to appropriate additional government funds to pay Credit 
Moblier charges. The 1864 Pacific Railroad Act passed by Congress doubled the land 
grants for construction.289 The side benefit to the congressmen was that their shares in the 
company increased in value. 
In 1872 a list of Oakes Ames stock contacts, not necessarily those who received 
stock, appeared during President Grant’s bid for a second term. The list included the then 
vice-president, the nominee for vice-president, the speaker of the house, a future 
president (James Garfield) and nine others. Ultimately some of those on the list were 
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shown not to have accepted stock. While Ames and James Brooks, a democrat from New 
York (who had been a Government director of the Union Pacific Railroad in 1867), were 
censured by Congress in 1873; no criminal or civil charges were ever filed. According to 
both Cleveland and Powell “the attitude of Ames and his associates towards public 
officials was one which had been winked at and condoned for decades by a public that 
now demanded a sacrifice,” he was “the man to whose efforts the success of the great 
task is mainly due.”290 Later Ames was exonerated by the state of Massachusetts (in 
1883) and commemorated by the Union Pacific Railroad. The investors in the railroad 
who were left with nearly worthless securities probably felt differently from Cleveland 
and Powell, the Union Pacific, and the state of Massachusetts. It was the views of these 
investors that helped to create the climate that led to the ICA. Ultimately the Credit 
Moblier Scandal may be viewed as everything from the result of a yellow journal tabloid 
competition between the New York Times and the New York Sun to a political ploy to 
influence Grant’s re-election in 1872 with some basis in fact for both views.291 
In the end, as much $180 million of capital stock in the roads was said to be 
missing (the promoters of the Credit Moblier are said to have cleared $23 million and 
maybe more).292 While most of the losses are attributable to fraud on the part of the 
principals, investors driven by their own greed must bear part of the blame.  Against this, 
it may be true that without Durant and the Credit Moblier construction of the Union 
Pacific would have been delayed; what would that delay have cost the country?  The 
                                                     
290 Cleveland, Railroad Finance, 69. 
 
 291 Brands, American Colossus, 356-360. 
 
292 “The Credit Moblier Scandal.” “Durant’s Big Scam.” 
 
  
82 
 
financing of the Central Pacific was not much different with Charles Crocker’s Crocker 
and Company and later his Contract and Finance Company serving as the construction 
companies for the Central Pacific. Leland Stanford, one of the road’s principles, 
ultimately left the money he made to the University built to memorialize his son.293 
However, as pointed out by James Surowieki, who is a staff writer for The New Yorker 
(where he writes a column on business and finance) unlike Enron, Credit Moblier and its 
Central Pacific counterparts really did build something: “people are still riding trains on 
the U. P. line.”294 It may also be noted that during the same time period, the Central 
Overland California and Pikes Peak Express (better known as the “Pony Express”) lasted 
only eighteen months, charged $5 for a letter and ended in bankruptcy and a bond 
scandal.295 
 Perhaps the biggest railroad “scam” of all, as noted by Wolmar, in his discussion 
of the building of the transcontinental, was that the transcontinental (like many of its 
predecessors and successors) could not have been financially viable at the time in which 
it was built—“[t]here  was no potential for immediate profit from the transcontinental.”296 
The only one of the transcontinental railways that was a financial success was James J. 
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Hill’s Great Northern—the only one of the five transcontinentals to be built without 
government subsidy.297  
Stock watering was another common fraud. The reputed origin of the term was 
the practice of cattle drovers to feed their stock salt and then gave them free access to 
water prior to sale, in order to increase their weight. This practice was attributed to 
Daniel Drew in his pre-railroad career. In watering stock the assets of a company were 
inflated and the stock of the company was sold based on the inflated value. Officers of 
the company pocketed the difference between the actual value and the value of the 
watered stock. The Hepburn commission determined that between fifty and seventy per 
cent of the New York Central $90 million of stock was water. Since dividends were 
based on the watered stock there was increased pressure to make lines profitable. This 
also led to rate inflation as the managers justified their dividend rates based on the lines 
watered valuation. 298 
 A common practice of the train lines was to induce settlers to move to the West 
through the use of “fairyland pamphlets” that presented an idealized picture of life in the 
West—“[t]he world portrayed in much of this publicity material was far divorced from 
the harsh reality.” This practice can be counted along with the other railroad deceptions. 
Sale of land along the right-of-way to farmers and other settlers helped pay for 
construction costs. Later, the lines would benefit from commerce created by the settlers. 
Originally the marketing was directed to the people living in the Eastern United States 
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and then to people in Europe; in fact the reality of the upheavals and oppression in 
Europe may have contributed more to emigration than the “Utopian” images of the  
railways.299 
Having reviewed some of the many ways in which practices that were at least  
questionable, if not outright illegal, cost investors and settlers, it is important to 
understand that not all of the rail stock losses were caused by corrupt practices or were 
within the control of rail line financers or managers. The Panic of 1873 is an example.  
Jay Cooke, head of “America’s premier banking house” and the chief financer of the 
Union Army, undertook the building of the Northern Pacific in 1870.300 To finance this 
venture he had to look to Europe for financing.  At the same time one-tenth of the 
Franco-Prussian War indemnity of 1871 was to be paid in gold (this initially created 
additional German capital). The German government stopped minting silver coins in 
1871, while insurers were paying out on the Chicago fire of 1871 and the Boston fire of 
1872. The Credit Moblier scandal erupted in 1872 and was fresh in memory. By the 
Coinage Act of 1873 the United States moved to a gold standard and the World 
Exhibition in Vienna in May of 1873 failed to revive the Austrian economy. The Granger 
laws, which threatened railroad regulation, had been passed. They dampened optimism 
about rail stocks and reduced the value of some rail stocks to 6 cents on the dollar. Also, 
there were real estate booms in Berlin, Vienna, and Chicago that competed with the 
railroads for investment dollars. The result of all of these factors was a reduction of 
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money available for investment in the building of railways.301  Financial collapse started 
in Austria and Germany in 1873 and reached the United States in September of that year. 
Cooke was heavily invested in the Northern Pacific. He could not get a new loan for 
construction and there was no market for the securities held by his bank.  Cooke’s bank, 
Jay Cooke & Co., collapsed and declared bankruptcy on September 18, 1873. This set off 
a chain of bank and business failures. Corporations controlling almost half of the nation’s 
train track mileage went into receivership in the depressions of 1873 and 1893.302 One 
victim of the Panic was Daniel Drew, one of the most notorious of the “robber barons.”303  
 Railroad financing played a part in the panic of 1873, but no one ever accused Jay 
Cooke of any sort of chicanery. Railroad losses occurred as a consequence of events on a 
national and global scale. The Northern Pacific, which was the largest railroad enterprise 
of its time, was eventually completed in 1883.304 
 This review of the early financing of the railroads leaves major questions 
unanswered. If the management practices were so corrupt and the returns so low in 
comparison with the short-term interest rates, why did local European bankers (who were 
not naïve American farmers) and conservative investors continue to see railroad 
securities as conservative investments and back and buy these products? If stock, 
financial, and managerial manipulation were major issues and the rail corporations 
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operated under state charters, why were the states not more active in enforcing the 
charters?  
 From this review it is seen that historians have focused on machinations of a few 
well-known, colorful “villains.” However, it is not clear how prevalent abuses really 
were. 
 When looking at the issue of railroad mismanagement and corruption, it is 
important to remember that some of the practices required to finance and build businesses 
in 19th century America may be dubious only in retrospect, and even in that time period 
(as is true today), the skills and financing that entrepreneurs needed to start these 
enterprises differed from those needed to run them. It should also be considered that the 
late 19th century was a time when the ethics of business and the laws that were to regulate 
business were in a state of flux as noted by Thomas Cooley in the first Report of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. Finally, it should be appreciated that from 1865 to 
1885, the period just prior to the ICA, freight rates dropped by a third to a half, despite 
the corruption.  It should be reiterated that railroads were actually built and provided a 
service vital to the growth and unity of the country.305 
 
Origins of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Regulatory Agencies 
 While the ICC was the first official independent federal agency it had multiple 
predecessors on both the federal and state levels. It is for this reason that both Mashaw 
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and Novak see the ICC as a continuance of regulatory processes that started long before 
1887, and not as a particularly defining moment. 306 
 Early federal administrative agencies included the U. S. Patent Office, the Post 
Office, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Army Corp of Engineers, the General Land 
Office, and most notably the Pension Office of the Department of the Interior (which had 
a work force of more than 6,000 and in 1891 was said to be the largest executive bureau 
in the world).307 Massachusetts had an insurance commission in 1852. State insurance 
commissions, which started as information collectors, moved to become regulatory  
bodies by the 1870s. 308  
These agencies had a common root, the response of government to the need for 
regulation of business or areas of society that were growing in size and complexity 
beyond the ability of governmental control.309 Another commonality of the early agencies 
is that they were less than successful. Friedman notes that the Pension Office worked 
“often badly” and “that insurance regulation in this period was not a triumphant 
success.”310 
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Initially railroads were established under state charters and the states attempted to 
use the charters of incorporation to exert control over the emerging railways and other 
enterprises to prevent their reputed abuses.311 Later, due to the poor success of the 
charters, they developed the state railroad commissions that regulated freight rates, in 
addition to agencies controlling warehouses, grain elevators, banking, insurance, 
education, and health.312  
 Connecticut issued a state railroad charter in 1832; in 1844 Rhode Island created a 
railroad commission to prevent rate discrimination and New Hampshire had a  
commission to monitor safety.313 Connecticut set up the first permanent commission,  
tasked with monitoring compliance to the charters in 1844.314 Maine followed with a 
commission in the 1850s. These commissions were variously charged. In addition to the 
powers already noted, they were to settle disputes among rival railways, control rates and 
services, inspect the books and records of the companies, reduce accidents, and monitor 
the physical equipment.  In 1855 New York created a commission. The New York 
commissioners were paid off by the railroads and voted to end the commission in 1857. 
Massachusetts established a commission in 1869 that became a model for other states. 
Publicity, annual reports to the legislature, and an energetic chairman, Charles Francis 
Adams, Jr. (descendant of two American presidents and later to be the president of the 
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Union Pacific Railroad), were the only means this commission had to enforce its 
decisions.315 The Massachusetts commission was the prototype of the so-called “weak” or 
advisory commission (commonly found in the Eastern states). It had “general supervision 
of all railroads,” and the ability to inform the companies when rates or modes of 
operation required change, but weak commissions lacked enforcement power and “they 
had no power to fix rates or make any major changes on their own.”316 The weak 
commissions fundamentally served to provide expert opinion for the legislative branch of 
the state governments.317  
 The Illinois’ Railroad and Warehouse Commission was established in 1871. It 
was expanded and given the legal power to prosecute violations in 1873. The Illinois 
commission exemplifies the “strong” commission (more common in the Mid-West), 
which had the legal power to enforce state laws and the authority to set maximum  
rates.318 Elimination of rate discrimination and advising the legislature were also among 
the important foci of the strong commissions. Most strong commissions were not under 
the supervision of the governor. Commissioners had administrative, quasi-judicial, and 
legislative functions.319 The authority of this type of commission was upheld (see above) 
by the Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois (1877) and supported by the Grangers.  
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 Virginia established a Railroad Commission in 1877, South Carolina in 1878, and 
Georgia established a commission in 1879 with the power to fix rates. 320  As early as  
1876 there were attempts to form a Railroad Commission in Texas. When the Texas 
Railroad Commission (ultimately to become one of the most important of the state 
commissions) finally came into being in 1891 it gave its first chairman, John Reagan, the 
ability to regulate rates, prevent rebates and pooling, and to prevent stock “watering.”321 
 In the long run the state commissions tended to be either corrupted (especially in 
the case of New York and California) or not live up to expectations. Some of the worst 
offenses of the railroads could have been curbed by the state penal laws, but these laws 
were not enforced due to the fact that the states’ created independent advisory  
commissions that usually did not have enforcement powers (i.e., “weak”  
commissions).322 In practice the coalitions of farmers and merchants that led to their 
formation tended to fall apart after the commissions were established. Over the long term 
most of the state commissions and railroad companies learned to coexist. Ultimately the 
road consolidations and the increase in interstate and through traffic went beyond state 
control.323 Finally the Supreme Court intervened in Wabash Railroad v. Illinois (1886) 
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and established federal control over the railroads, at least in the area of interstate 
commerce.324 
 The adoption of the commission form of regulation in the ICA was controversial 
and, as noted, opposed by Reagan and his supporters.  It represented, in the words of 
Woll, the “transference of the concept of commission regulation from the state to the 
national level.” 325 Arguments in favor of the commission form (then and now) include: 
1) the ability of a commission to provide specialists with expert knowledge to the 
Congress and courts; 2) the need for a permanent body that could provide for continuity 
of service; 3) the establishment of an agency that would be relatively free from political  
pressure.326 Opponents feared that in the end commissions would be dominated by the 
carriers.  
 Railroad regulations did exist in other countries; however, it is of interest that in 
the United Kingdom, unlike in the US, safety was the main issue leading to regulation.327 
British railway regulation, which developed at the same time as American regulation had 
little impact in America.328 
Agencies/commissions did not arise de novo with the ICC, nor were the 
weaknesses and problems of commissions unique and unknown to the legislators who 
established the ICA. As a consequence the ICC may have been less of a “watershed” than 
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it is commonly represented to be. Although the ultimate failure of the state commissions 
led to the establishment of the federal commission, the long experience with federal 
agencies and state commissions did not benefit the ICC.329 As noted by the Cullom 
committee “Congress is entering upon a new and untried field. Its legislation…is 
incapable of accurately forecasting its effect.”330 At its core the notion of the commission 
did have several compelling ideas. What was missing was a direction (a mission) and the  
internal structure that would enable the commission to use these ideas to advantage.331 
 
The Origins of the Interstate Commerce Commission; Discussion 
The typical history of the ICC suggests that the Commission was the result of the  
successful pressure exerted by special interest groups that included the Grangers, 
merchants, oil shippers and to an extent railroad managers as a consequence of the frauds 
and discriminations perpetrated by the railroads. It particularly stresses the view that the 
Commission was established to rectify the wrongs done by the carriers to the farmers and 
small shippers by the railroads. This is the result of the presentation of a one-sided view 
of the impact of rail transport.  As noted by Martin “[n]ot for the embattled American 
farmer, nor the politician who coveted his vote, was the abstract idea that transportation 
created value.”332 While the influence of the special interests and wrong doings of the 
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railways cannot be denied, this history demonstrates that they are overstated as factors 
leading to the ICC. This review indicates that the reality was much more complex. 
By the time of the passage of the ICA and the creation of ICC in 1887, the special 
interest groups that originally drove their establishment had become less influential. The 
groups, which had originally promoted the issues that led to Congressional action, had 
dissipated. Specifically, the Grangers were no longer a powerful political entity.  Their 
legacy, the notion of oppressive railroads, remained to be a cause taken up by populist 
politicians. While oil interests and merchants may have initiated the movement to 
regulation in the 1870s, support for the ICA, when it passed, came from the agricultural 
states of the South and Midwest where the populists had their strongest support, and not 
from the Northeast, the home of the oil interests and merchants. History also shows that 
railway support for regulation was at best acceptance and resignation.  As for the 
politicians who voted for the ICA, many and perhaps most, lacked an educated 
understanding of the issues involved; they were responding to the politics of the time and 
the pressures of an earlier time. 
Furthermore, this review indicates that many of the charges against the lines (i.e., 
rate issues, financial wrong doing, and excessive profits on the part of the railroad lines) 
have less substance than often presented. This is especially true when viewed in terms of 
the business practices of the times.   
There were undoubtedly cases of mismanagement and fraud that required 
regulation. This is well documented in Thomas Cooley’s first annual report to the 
Congress in which he also notes the absence of laws to regulate the railways leading to 
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“abnormal law-making” on the part of the rail corporations.333 It needs to be considered 
that these practices may have been more often due to individual malefactors then the 
industry in general. Rail historian Keith Bryant Jr. noted: “Journalists created the image 
of the ‘robber baron’ who displayed no interest in operating a railroad for profit or in 
improving the property, but simply used the carrier’s stocks and bonds as a vehicle for 
personal gain…[This image] never dissipated and was used again and  again by the 
detractors of the industry as representative of all railroad executives.”334 One example is 
the reporting of the blue-blooded, yellow-journalism of the historian Henry Adams, 
which admittedly, which like its successors, had some factual basis.335 However, this 
review shows that even Jay   Gould, one of the great stock manipulators, ran his lines and 
added value to them. 
Discriminatory rates are said to be one of the major factors that led to the ICC and 
are mentioned in the first Annual Report of the ICC. However, they are extremely 
difficult to document and few specific cases were found in the sources, despite the 
frequent mention of “huge” discrimination reported by several authors. The best 
documentation is Vanderbilt’s ready admission of rebates in front of the New York 
Commission.  His admission, and comments, suggests that rebates were not hidden, 
readily available, seen as part of the normal way in which businesses operated, and 
controlled by local agents rather than the lines. Other forms of discrimination proved 
harder to document. Fogel notes a “government warehouse near Washington” containing 
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the “tariffs filed was the ICC.”  He also notes that even with these rates available “some 
procedure will have to be devised by which one can check the reliability of the evidence 
of the public record and estimate rebates for which no direct evidence exists.”336 
Many of the issues that led to the ICC were part of the longstanding great American 
divides—these were regional debates, and conflicts between agricultural and industrial 
interests, and between laborers and management—these debates were highlighted and 
accelerated by the changes that came with the trains.337  However, this review shows that 
many, if not most of the so-called “robber barons” ran their lines in a businesslike and 
efficient manner. At the time the ICA was debated and passed, the railroad rates were close 
to their historic lows.338 Biased presentations of the issues by partisans across the political 
and social spectrum have found its way into the histories of the period and lead one to 
question whether these practices on  their own would have led to federal regulation.  
While the Wabash case is seen as having forced the House and Senate to come to 
the compromise that was the ICA, I suggest that even this is too limited a perspective. I 
emphasize that the ICA was the result—the inevitable fulfillment—of the Federalist 
agenda, as inserted into the United States Constitution (the Commerce Clause) and 
championed by John Marshall. As such it had to happen sooner or later.  It was the result 
of a plan to create a unity among the states of the United States and to shift the balance 
the power between the state and federal governments through empowerment of the 
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central government. Commerce between the states was used to accomplish this goal.  The 
Commerce Clause, the federal courts, the ICA, the ICC, and the railroads were the tools 
needed to bring the plan to reality. This was a direction resisted into the late 19th century 
by the conservative proponents of states’ rights and even by the courts as seen in the 
cases cited. The Wabash case, in context of the Commerce Clause, forced the issue on the 
Supreme Court and therefore the country. The decision in Wabash was every bit as much 
about the assertion of federal power over states’ rights as it was about the control of the 
railroads. Perhaps this is the fact that explains the Court’s delay and reticence in directly 
addressing the Commerce Clause for so many years.   
The ICC was also the result of the growth in size and complexity of industry—an 
inability of the courts to deal with the emerging complex economic issues of the 
developing railroads (a view challenged by Supreme Court Justice J. David Brewer).339  
More than being the first independent government agency, the ICC marked the start of 
federal administrative law and the explosion of federal authority and bureaucracy, 
whether or not it was intended to do this.340 Prior to the ICC, under the doctrine of 
laissez-faire, central government interventions in business were meant to be helpful, not 
regulatory. It has been suggested that the promoters of the ICA still accepted the view 
that government intervention should be as minimal as possible and maintained an 
allegiance to limited government.341  Even as the government tried to shape industry (and 
the railroads in particular), industries were shaping the government. Friedman sees the 
                                                     
 339 Bernstein, Regulating Business, 26, 27, 30-32. 
 
 
340 Carrington, “Law and Economics,” 365, 378. 
 
341 Bernstein, Regulating Business, 22. Vander Velde, “Thomas M. Cooley,” 98. 
 
  
97 
 
administrative agency as the “child of necessity.” It is big government’s answer to big 
business, when the “[t]raditional agencies of government [and its courts] could not 
regulate big business” due to lack of specialists and specialized bodies.342 This is a notion 
that Shelby Collum recognized through his earlier interactions in Illinois, and that Grover 
Cleveland and Thomas Cooley endorsed. It was a notion consistent with the goal of 
creating a durable, politically independent commission of experts to arbitrate within the 
industry and mediate between the industry and government. Such an agency would be a 
bulwark against excessive centralization of executive power and thereby protect both  
shippers and carriers.343 The issues of durability and expertise are particularly important 
and should be viewed in light of the fact that at the time of the establishment of the ICC 
legislatures in many states met biennially, and most of the legislators served limited terms. 
Few congressmen had any knowledge of railroading. The size of government was such that 
on the national level, “President Cleveland personally answered the White House telephone 
and sometimes the doorbell.”  Large cities were the first to look to experts to direct 
technical services such as sewers, parks, and public health.344   
In concluding this section of the thesis, the first two questions posed can be 
answered. Viewing the origin of the ICA and ICC from the various historical perspectives 
that have been taken in the current thesis indicates that regulatory commissions were not 
invented in 1887; their origins were deeply embedded in American history.345 The ICC 
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was not the result of any one particular activity, individual, or reform movement (as is 
typically and simplistically presented) or even a coordination of groups, but the 
consequence of multiple factors, many of long duration and probably not unique to the 
American experience.  The research does not deny, but brings to question the nature and 
the extent of the so-called railroad abuses and highlights the need for further investigation 
in this area. Two of the most important factors leading to the ICA and ICC appear to be 
the need for legislators to appease their constituents’ perceptions of railroad wrongdoing 
and the influence exerted on the origin through the existence of the Commerce Clause of 
the United States’ Constitution.346 The Commission form was chosen because of inherent 
theoretical strengths. However, the commission was given little direction and structured 
without the power to initiate or enforce its rulings. As a consequence it was doomed to 
fail.  
The ICC was to set the pattern for the government commissions and agencies to 
come. How the ICC developed to fulfill this role will be addressed in the next section of 
the thesis.  
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IV 
 
The Development of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 1887-1918 
 
Following passage of the Act, the initial response was generally very positive, but 
of short duration.347 There were some improvements in pricing. While rates went up on 
some lines they were more predictable and stable.348 The carriers submitted annual 
reports.349 Carriers made attempts to adjust rates to the length of the haul.350 Therefore, 
the ICC may have provided some benefit to the railroad industry and those who depended 
upon it. Despite these successes, the fact is that in its early years the ICC was frustrated 
by small staffs, conflicts with state regulatory agencies (in some states as part of the 
Granger Laws), highly competent railroad attorneys and jurisdictional disputes, not to 
mention the limitations of the ICA (since Congress had neglected to grant the ICC the 
power to set rates).351 Determination of discriminatory rates proved to be technically and 
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politically difficult.352 At best, in its early years, the ICC did little harm to the railroad 
industry and its consumers. 
 The standard story of the period following the passage of the ICA is one in which 
the history of the ICC is divided into two periods. In the first period the ICC’s role was 
poorly defined and the ICC was restricted by court decisions. At the end of this period it 
was generally accepted that the ICC was powerless. In the second period, in response to 
the support of the progressives, the Commission was able to develop. At the end of this 
period the ICC had been empowered and came to dominate the railways. A different 
approach will be used here, one that is similar to that taken in the first part of the thesis. 
Here the period will not be divided. Rather the continuity in the evolution of the ICC 
from 1887 until the federal takeover of the railroads at the end 1917 will be traced in 
various perspectives. It is felt that this approach better reflects the evolution of the ICC 
and the factors that influenced it. 
 To start, the development of the railroads and their interrelationship with the ICC 
during this period will be briefly reviewed as a background to the understanding of the 
changes taking place in the carriers and their relationship with the ICC. Major changes 
affected the lines: technological developments, changes that led to consolidation of lines, 
and shifts in financing with the onset of American capitalism (as the America banking 
system was developing and European money was less available) will be described. Then, 
this time frame will be revisited to focus on the developing structure and scope of the 
ICC.  First, the earliest period of the ICC when it was under the influence of Thomas 
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Cooley the first chairman of the ICC, his vision and impact, will be highlighted. Next, the 
court’s relationship and impact on the development of the ICC will be reviewed. Finally, 
the expansion of the ICC’s influence under the Progressives, the president and Congress, 
and the legislative acts that shaped the ICC, will be reviewed. The role that the changes in 
the structure and the organization of the ICC played in its development will be considered 
along with the social and political influences that particularly favored the development of 
the Commission will be reviewed. This is despite the fact that at least one major scholar 
of independent commissions (Marver Bernstein) seems to have downplayed the role of 
structure.353 
 
The Development of the ICC and the Railroads: 1887-1918 
 
 The jury consists of twelve persons chosen to decide who has the better lawyer 
                                                                                                                      —Robert Frost. 
 “Until 1906, for the most part the ICC was powerless, unable to impose its rules 
 on the industry and given the runaround by clever railroad-company 
 lawyers…” 
                                                                                                                       —Wolmar354 
 “My special field of knowledge is figures—a subject of which most lawyers 
 know next to nothing” 
                                                                                                                        —Brandeis.355 
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  The railroads were the first of the large corporations. They had been initiated in a 
period with limited or absent government restraints—an environment that has been 
described as “the ideal hothouse for the rapid flowering of private economy. Government 
did little to help and, more important, even less to hinder this explosion of entrepreneurial 
energy.”356 The Interstate Commerce Commission came in to being with the Interstate 
Commerce act in 1887 as the first attempt by the government to control a major industrial 
age corporation. Because of lack of enforcement power and the fact that its cease and 
desist orders were often ignored, the ICC had to go to the federal court to enforce its 
rulings.  In the courts, the average case lasted for four years—many lasted much longer—
due to legal maneuvering.  By the late 1890s, due to the vagueness and ambiguity of the 
ICA, frequent resistance of the carriers and the actions of the federal courts, the ICC lost 
cases.  The ICC was essentially rendered powerless by time-consuming legal 
procedures.357As Richard S. Olney, a originally a corporate lawyer and then Attorney 
General under Cleveland, said of the ICC in 1896, “It satisfies the popular clamor for a 
government supervision of the railroads, at the same time that such supervision is almost 
entirely nominal.”358   
 A major goal of the ICC was to eliminate long-short haul discrimination, as stated 
in section four of the ICA. This proved difficult based on the wording of the act that 
stated rates were to be made equal under similar circumstances. At first the ICC 
exempted railroads that competed with unregulated carriers (water, intrastate, and foreign 
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carriers) and gave the lines the option to make their own determinations. This was 
changed in 1892. In the Interstate Commerce Commission v, Alabama Midland Railway 
Co., 69 Fed 227 (1895) case the Supreme Court accepted the railways view that “no two 
points were similar,” which effectively destroyed the ICC’s ability to regulate long-short 
haul rates.359 
At the same time railroads, like the other nascent businesses, were becoming 
larger and more complex.  The lines were undergoing consolidation. As noted most lines 
started as localized short lines. Starting in the 1850s these lines joined, end to end, to 
form trunk lines. From 1873 the trunk lines acquired feeder lines to become railroad 
systems. In 1889, an attempt was made to get around the anti-pooling section of the ICA. 
Led by J. P. Morgan, a group of bankers and railroad presidents formed the Interstate 
Commerce Railway Association to maintain rates. The organization had very limited 
success, but it was supported by the ICC.360 The systems, partially in response to the ban 
on pooling and also due to the economic circumstances (Panic of 1893) started to 
consolidate in the late 1890s.361  By the early 1900s consolidation of lines was 
progressing aided by the Panic, which led to the pruning of the weaker lines.  Another 
attempt at cooperation was the Joint Traffic Association formed in 1896. Despite 
opposition by the ICC, it had some success in maintaining grain rates.  The Association 
collapsed in 1897.362 At the end of the 19th century there were seven large corporations 
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that were dominated by the banking houses of J. P. Morgan and Company and Kuhn, 
Loeb and Company. Cooperation between the corporations was tacit and took place in 
spite of the ICC. Consolidation permitted J. P. Morgan to meld the Southern railroads 
together for more efficient transport of raw materials and vacationers; it permitted the 
passengers to travel further without the need to change trains.363 Government tolerance of 
coordination of efforts had it limits as demonstrated by the dissolution of the Northern 
Securities Company by the Supreme Court in 1904.  
 After the Panic of 1893, times were good for the train industry. Alexander 
Cassatt, who became the president of the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1899, introduced the 
idea of communities of interest. Under this idea, the New York Central and Pennsylvania 
bought stock in competing lines in order to present a united front against big shippers 
(such as the Rockefeller oil interests) in order to prevent rate cutting. Communities of 
interest soon spread to lines in other parts of the country.364  Passenger travel, especially 
elite and business travel, increased. Electric lights and steam heat became standards. 
Larger, more powerful and faster locomotives pulled trains more comfortably and 
efficiently. Improved wheels and roadbeds made travel safer and more comfortable. 
Safety was also improved with more sophisticated signaling systems and the erection of 
fences along the right-of-way. Wood frame cars were replaced by the safer all-steel cars.  
The culmination was the introduction of high-profile luxury trains. During this period the 
lines made profits on their busy routes, but lost money on the poorly traveled routes. 
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From 1870 to 1900, farm prices dropped 37 per cent, but over the same thirty years 
freight rates dropped by close to 70 per cent.365 
 After signing the ICA President Cleveland did little to strengthen the ICC. Prior to 
his election to the presidency, in 1889, Benjamin Harrison had been a corporation lawyer, 
generally took a pro-business position and little interest in the ICC. Due to the economic 
prosperity during his time in office, President McKinley gave the ICC little support.366 
 The picture began to change at the start of the 20th century. Rising costs led to the 
higher rates that followed the long period in which rates had declined or remained stable. 
The railroad lines were not able to meet the demands of the new century with 19th-
century equipment. Increased operating costs and inflationary pressures created a need 
for capital. At the same time investors had more lucrative opportunities in emerging 
enterprises. During this time period three new members were appointed to the 
Commission, Martin A. Knapp, Charles A Prouty and Judson C Clements, all lawyers by 
training and all opposed to rate hikes (although Knapp did favor pools). At the same time 
efforts to strengthen the ICC led by Shelby Cullom failed because of Senators who were 
supportive of the carrier’s interests.367 
 At the same time rate discrimination continued. While the ICC had some 
tolerance towards the railroad communities, the progressives and especially Theodore 
Roosevelt rejected self-regulation through consolidation and favored empowerment of 
the Commission. The Elkins Act of 1903, which was a collaboration between Knapp, 
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Prouty and Elkins (who supported the shippers) and James A. Logan of the Pennsylvania 
Railroad, was supposed to end rebates. Even after passage of the Elkins Act, the railroads 
continued with their discriminatory practices, including new rebates in the form of 
special “midnight rates” These were special rates offered to large shippers that were 
revoked as soon as the shipment had been made.368 
In 1904, in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904), the 
Supreme Court ruled in the government’s favor, and effectively ended the movement to 
consolidation.369 In the same year, Roosevelt, with the support of Midwestern Governors 
Robert M. La Folette and Albert B Cummins, as well as others, began the process that 
would give the ICC the power to regulate interstate rates and enforce its decisions. Their 
goal was attained in 1906 when the Hepburn Act was passed under the influence of the 
Progressive Movement. It has been suggested by the Hoogenbooms that the movement 
for regulation was a result of strong popular, and thereafter political, support in the face 
of strong opposition by the carriers.370 
 The Hepburn Act set maximum rates and required that rates be “just and 
reasonable” as determined by the ICC. This occurred at a time when the railways found 
that the increased revenue from growth of traffic could not cover the rising costs, fixed 
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rates, and the need to modernize the systems (James Hill estimated that the industry 
would require $5 billion).  Problems faced by the railroads included increased labor costs 
based on newly passed labor legislation, increased costs due to regulation and the 
inability of the companies to work together due to antitrust laws. There was also the 
public’s and the ICC’s distrust of railroad management that was justified by the actions of 
the bankers and promoters who looted the Chicago and Alton and the Rock Island lines 
between 1898 and 1905– according to Hoogenbaum  the role of the “the unscrupulous 
railroad managers, who damaged the reputation of all railroads” has often been 
ignored.371 The year 1901 was the year in which Frank Norris’ The Octopus appeared 
with its vision of the American railroad: 
 the galloping monster, the terror of steel and steam, with its symbol of a vast 
 power, huge, terrible…the leviathan, with tentacles of steel clutching into the soil, 
 the soulless Force, the iron-hearted  Power, the monster, the Colossus, the 
 Octopus.372 
 
On the other hand, it should be noted that Norris’ farmers were not Jefferson’s “virtuous  
 
small farmers.” They can easily be seen as the prototypes of the modern corporate  
 
farmers. They were not bereft of financial or political power and influence, and hesitated  
 
only briefly when it came to using both to influence politicians. 
 
 In 1903 Louis Brandeis began his seven-year crusade that ultimately proved 
Morgan’s role in the mismanagement and fraud in the running of the New York, New 
Haven and Hartford (the final order to separate the New Haven and Boston and Maine 
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came from James McReynolds, then the Attorney General; later, McReynolds was to 
have a problematic relationship with Brandeis when they both served on the Supreme  
Court and McReynolds was Franklin Roosevelt’s bane as one of the four horsemen).373 
 The Mann-Elkins Act of June, 1910, further increased the ICC’s control over 
rates. It established a “Commerce Court” to hear appeals from rate decisions, extended 
ICC control to telephone, telegraph and cable companies, deleted the phase “under 
substantially similar circumstances and conditions” from the original ICA based on the 
Court’s rulings, permitted suspension of rate increases for up to ten months, and placed 
the burden on the carriers to show the reasonableness of the rate increases. At this time, 
after President Taft appointed two new commissioners, the members of the ICC reputedly 
considered themselves to be judges and not policy makers.374 The funding for the 
“Commerce Court” was not renewed in 1913 as the court was seen to be favoring the 
railroads.375 
 In 1910, railroads in the Western Traffic Association and in the Northeast 
requested a general rate increase. Hearings on the requests were held for the eastern lines 
in New York and Washington D. C. For the western lines, hearings were held in Chicago. 
Brandeis was asked to join those opposed to these rate increases.376 The hearings shed 
light on railroad management. Throughout all stages of the hearings Brandeis showed 
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that the witnesses for the increases could not provide any basis for the requested increase. 
According to the New York Evening Post “they did not know how the figures they  
presented had been arrived at…they did not know the causes of the thing.”377 These 
witnesses included top managers of the most important lines in the country. Their lack of 
understanding of costs of services and charges were, in this regard, very much in line 
with business practices of the late 19th century and the same could be said of leaders in 
most of the industries of the time.378 Of note, but probably not so surprising, in this case 
the Railway Brotherhoods were supportive of the management in their efforts. Brandeis, 
under the Mann-Elkins act was able to show that the corporations had not met their new 
obligation to show that the rate increases were justified and not solely based on the 
arbitrary judgments of the railroad corporations (the Mann-Elkins Act states “the burden 
of proof to show that the…proposed increased rate is just and reasonable shall be upon 
the common carrier”).379 His argument, in line with the progressive principles, was that 
there was no need to increase rates since substantial savings would result from efficiency 
and greater “scientific” management. He presented expert witnesses to prove his point. 
Brandeis also insinuated that the railways were being manipulated by bankers who 
controlled the railways and iron companies manipulating them both to attain the highest 
benefits to themselves. Accounting data were presented by Brandeis to prove that the 
financial situation of the lines was better than they had represented it to be. Most 
controversially, Brandeis claimed the lines could save close to $1 million per day in 
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wages alone by following his suggestions. Both the eastern and western hearings went 
poorly for the railways. 380  On February 23, 1911, the ICC delivered its decision. It 
unanimously rejected the request for increased rates.  
 In May of 1913, the railroads asked for a rehearing on the case for a five per cent 
rate increase. From 1901 to 1913 operating expenses had increased 42 per cent, while 
revenues had increased only 33 per cent. On this occasion the carriers got some support 
for the increases from some shippers and no opposition from others.381 The ICC 
employed Brandeis to serve as special counsel. Mason states that Brandeis’ role for the 
Commission was to make sure that all of the facts were presented and to be neutral; 
Hoogenboom states his role was to “represent those opposed to a general rate 
increase.”382 Immediately his appointment and impartiality were questioned. Apparently, 
Brandeis’ stance antagonized both shippers and transportation companies. His view was 
that in many cases the railways were undercompensated, but that rate increases by the 
ICC would not solve the problem. Instead, in these hearings he stressed the financial 
mismanagement as causative for the current financial problems.  He also felt that the 
compensation paid out, when fairly earned by the railroads, should not be limited. The 
decision, which on this occasion was not unanimous, that the ICC handed down on July 
29, 1914, reflected Brandeis views; it granted the increases only in the Central Freight  
association’s territory.383  
                                                     
 380 Hoogenboom, A History of the ICC, 60-66. 
 
 381 Hoogenboom, A History of the ICC, 71-71. 
 
 382 Hoogenboom, A History of the ICC, 70. 
 
 
383 Hoogenboom, A History of the ICC, 70-73. Mason, Brandeis, 335-348. 
 
  
111 
 
 Under the shadow of World War One, which started in Europe in August of 1914, 
the railroads once more asked to be reheard. Once more Brandeis appeared as council for 
the ICC. Even though the case was essentially a retrial, this time the Commission (with 
the support of President Woodrow Wilson) voted, to Brandeis’ disappointment, to grant 5 
per cent increases by a 5-to-2 margin. This increase actually provided little relief to the 
stressed lines.384  
 Alpheus Mason, Brandeis’ biographer, has stated that the ICC’s 1915 decision 
was “puzzling, since little or no additional evidence was presented to warrant it.”385 
Brandeis was certainly the better and most convincing lawyer throughout most of the 
battles. He was almost certainly right that the railroads accounting and managerial 
methods were obsolete. That the carriers would have benefited from a better analysis of 
unit costs was something on which many of the lines’ managers would also agree.386  
They also agreed that there were improvements to be made by “scientific management”  
and that there were economies in the systems that would have saved them money. 387  
However, considering the decision from the perspective of time and the railroads costs, 
charges, productivity, and profits, makes the final vote of the ICC more understandable. 
First, Brandeis, or least one of his experts had gotten his facts wrong. One of Brandeis’ 
scientific managers, Harrington Emerson, claimed that the carriers could save $300 
million a year in labor costs. He based this on the railways paying annual wages of $6 
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billion. In fact they only paid $1.1 billion in wages.388 It should be noted that the railways 
had not denied science; they had made many “science based” improvements to the lines 
as noted above, which had required massive inputs of capital and resulted in lowering of 
freight and passenger rates.389 Management had improved, without violating the laws, by 
such mechanisms as the creation of union stations, which permitted easier transfer 
between lines. Dividends were paid in the range from 5.4 to 8 per cent (compared to a 
short term rate of 4 to 7 per cent between 1900 and1920).390 Costs of rail transportation 
undercut most water transportation costs on the canals and rivers. The efficiency of rail 
workers had increased two and one-half times. On the other hand the worker’s wages had 
increased almost as fast as productivity—“compensation of labor per rail revenue dollar 
rose from an average of 40 cents in the years 1895-99 to 46 cents in the years 1911-
15.”391 Rail debt had increased and the operating ratio increased from a healthy 65 to 68 
per cent to almost 70 per cent.392 Brandeis seems to have ignored the fact that while 
major savings could be achieved through increase in efficiency the major schemes that 
could have led to economies of scale were prohibited by the ICC.  Railroads were 
forbidden by law from what was potentially their greatest cost cutter—cooperation and 
coordination (pooling) between lines. The bond market at the time supported the lines’ 
appraisal of their financial situation. In 1910 the market for bonds, even for “good bonds, 
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guaranteed by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, could not find a purchaser” (according to 
Daniel Willard, President of the Baltimore and Ohio); this was at a time when the net 
earnings of national banks averaged 8.5 to 10 per cent, with minimal risk when compared 
to the railroad bonds.393 It should also be noted that based on a joint congressional 
committee report of 1914, it was determined that the railroads were entitled to an increase 
in compensation for carrying the mails, which was approved by the Commission and 
even Brandeis agreed the lines were underpaid $15 million for carrying the mail.394  
 An issue frequently unmentioned is the competition from fast-freight lines and 
private-car lines, or their corruption potential, even though they controlled “virtually all 
the high-rated freight.”   
 Originally set up in the 1850s as independent stock companies (to get around 
rules against pooling), fast-freight lines owned their own rolling stock and were able to 
operate over multiple railroads, which provided for through traffic and maintenance of 
the rolling stock.395 They carried high priority high value freight for a wide range of 
customers. Because of concerns from legislatures and stockholders, in 1866 co-operative 
lines were formed. These were no longer separate companies, but administrative pools to 
which the major trunk lines contributed cars.396  The First Annual Report of the Interstate 
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Commerce Commission specified that it was doubtful that express companies, not 
controlled by railways, were within the ICA’s jurisdiction.397 Later the Hepburn Act 
brought them under ICC control and as a result they were investigated by ICC 
commissioner Franklin K. Lane who issued reports on them in 1912 and 1913.398  
 Unlike the fast-freight cars, the private-cars tended to be specialty cars owned and 
operated by large producers—refrigeration cars were owned by meat packers and tanker 
cars were owned by the oil companies.    
 The issue of the practices, discrimination, extent, and power of fast-freight and 
private-car lines is one that deserves further attention and research.399  
 Based on the events that followed it may be argued that, for once, the railroads 
had not had the better lawyer. Even though in the end the rate increases were granted and 
Brandeis did not prevail, Brandeis’s experience in these cases would have demonstrated 
to him the potential of the commission for regulation and shaped his view of 
commissions.  
 The rate increase granted by the Commission was followed by an increase in 
operating expenses and a decline in freight traffic. In 1914, the operating ratio had 
increased to an unsustainable 72 per cent. While gross revenues increased, net revenues  
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fell.400 As a result many of the lines were faced with bankruptcy. By 1915, one-sixth of 
the carriers representing 40,000 miles of track and $2.25 billion of capitalization were 
under court control or awaiting receivership. A declining credit picture (competing 
options offered creditors higher yields) limited the funds that were available for 
maintenance and improvements. When the rail traffic increased again in 1915 and 1916 
the lines were faced with union demands for an eight-hour day (instead of the ten-hour 
day they were working). After a long battle, and just prior to a Supreme Court ruling that 
favored the unions, the railroads yielded to the union’s demands.401  
 The 1915 requests for increases resulted in minimal changes in passenger or 
freight rates (despite the fact that the operating expenses on some of the western railroads 
had reached 79 per cent).402 In 1917, requests by the carriers, this time for an across-the- 
board 15 per cent increase due to the rising costs of dealing with war-related traffic, met 
with limited success despite support from some of the commissioners.403 
 As a result of these battles, when the United States entered World War I in April 
of 1917 its rail transportation system was in poor condition. After the start of the war rail 
traffic and operating costs increased once more.  Major issues included heavy eastbound 
traffic and the inability to empty the cars once they reached the ports. Secondary to the 
threat of German submarines there were fewer ships to accept the cargoes, therefore 
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railroad cars could not be unloaded and were used for storage. A five-man Railroad’s 
War Board setup by the rail executives failed to coordinate the lines, in part due to the 
Antitrust Act. Under the Esch Car-Service Act, passed in May of 1917, the ICC had the 
authority to control the movement and use of all railroad cars in order to deal with 
emergencies, but it failed to use this power.404  
 In August of 1917, at its request, Congress increased the size of the ICC to nine 
members and allowed three divisions and ten bureaus: Correspondence and Claims, 
Inquiry, Law, Carriers’ Accounts, Statistics, Safety, Locomotive Inspection, Valuation, 
Indices, and Car Service.  At this time decision making began to shift from the 
commissioners to examiners.405 
 On December 1, 1917, the ICC recommended that the government assume control 
of rail transportation. On December 28, the government took over operations of the 
railroads with support from the ICC, shippers, labor, wartime administrators and the 
railroads.406 This was not an act without precedent. At the time of the American Civil 
War, in the North, legislation had been passed that would have permitted the government 
to operate the lines if necessary. While the lines were not taken over, General Daniel 
McCallum used his authority to act as a liaison between the government and railroad 
presidents. McCallum also ran the United States Military Railroads, much of which ran 
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on the tracks of former Confederate railways.407  During the years of World War I the 
government ran the railways, under the United States Railroad Administration, headed by 
William Gibb McAdoo.  It should be noted at this point that that the legal authority of the 
ICC under the ICA did not extend to the physical operation of the railways.  The failed 
attempts of the ICC and Railroad’s War Board to coordinate the railroads’ activities, and 
the fact that Wilson and his advisors were displeased with the ICC created the need for 
the United States Railroad Administration.408 The Railroad Administration had to 
increase wages, freight rates (28 percent) and passenger fares (18 percent) and lost $2  
million per day (or $1.2 billion over 26 months).409 At this time the lines were running at 
an operating expense ratio of 87 per cent.410 
 During the war the ICC took direction from the Railroad Administration, 
functioning as an auxiliary agency. Commissioners helped by “drafting contracts, 
studying ways to increase efficiency (especially fuel consumption, mediating local 
disputes, performing safety inspections, and providing statistical information.411   
 On March 1, 1920 the government returned the railways to private control under 
the Transportation Act of 1920—commonly known as the Esch-Cummins Act— after 
much discussion over the fate of the lines. Among other provisions the Esch-Cummins 
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Act gave the ICC the power to set minimum rates, oversee railway finances and regulate 
acquisitions and mergers. It also directed the ICC to prepare a plan for consolidation of 
carriers. In many ways the Act continued the pre-World War I strengthening of the 
ICC.412 
 The importance of this time period in the Commission’s hearings was 
considerable. They demonstrated the change in the authority of the ICC that had taken 
place since the beginning of the century. At the peak of its power, just prior to the War 
the ICC could no longer be ignored. Even if the railways achieved limited goals in 1914, 
in the future the lines would have to answer to the ICC, as representatives of the people’s 
will. In this sense the hearings were a definite win for the ICC. One thing is abundantly 
clear, the carriers were not dictating policy to the ICC.  
 This time period saw a major shift in the way that the railways were viewed and  
evolving. They were moving from serving the needs of individual cities to being viewed  
more in terms of their ability to coordinate and serve the nation’s needs driven by large 
industries and the needs of finance  and capitalism.413 
 Moreover, in the late 19th century the federal government was weak and 
Washington DC a city of little significance compared to the great cultural, commercial, 
and financial centers. The rise of the nation, federal government and a national economy 
was fostered by the railroads, and the railroads were to be controlled through the ICC.414  
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To accomplish this it was important for the ICC to succeed—to flex its muscle. A win for 
the ICC was a win for the emergence of a strong centralized government. The 
government was going to have to deal with other problems using agencies and 
commissions. In 1906, the same year Sinclair’s The Jungle was published (and five years 
after Norris’ The Octopus) the Pure Food and Drug Act was passed, which led to the 
Food and Drug Administration. Congress passed the Sixteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution in 1909 and it was ratified in 1913, initiating the income tax (the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue, the progenitor of the Internal Revenue Service was formed in 1861, but 
originally did not collect income tax).415 The emergence of the ICC was in no small part 
due to its evolution under the influence of Thomas Cooley, its struggle with the courts, 
and support from the executive and legislative branches.  
 
The Development of the ICC and Thomas M. Cooley’s Vision of the ICC; 1887-1891 
Thomas M. Cooley was President’s Cleveland’s choice to be the first 
commissioner appointed to the ICC, and then its first chairman. Cooley was a choice that 
was widely applauded.  He was commonly acknowledged to be one of the country’s 
foremost jurists, legal teachers, and constitutional scholars. In addition he had experience 
dealing with railroads.416 It was under his commissionership that the limits imposed by 
the ICA on the jurisdiction of the ICC were first revealed and the movement to define and 
empower the Commission, which led greater control over the carriers, was initiated.   
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 Cooley was virtually self-taught. He never attended university or law school as a  
 
student, but often was invited to institutions of higher education as a guest lecturer. 
Initially he practiced law but also dabbled in real estate and politics. In 1848 he was an 
early organizer of the Free Soil party. In 1854 he was a Democratic candidate for a 
judgeship and after his defeat he became a Republican. When Cooley returned to law in 
Michigan in 1857 he became the court reporter for the Michigan Supreme Court and 
compiler of the laws of Michigan. In this role he gained recognition as “one with the 
capacity to interpret the law and apply it to established facts.”417 Cooley joined the 
faculty of the Law Department of the University of Michigan in 1859 and in 1864 he was 
elected to be a Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court. He continued to be re-elected for 
twenty years. Four years later he published A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 
Which Rest Upon the Legislatures of the Several States, the first of his many volumes, 
which was one of the seminal works of 19th-century judicial literature. In this book 
Cooley stated his support of the rights of local governments and property. While he was 
generally against centralized government control, he accepted a right for governmental 
interference in some cases. As time went on he apparently became more willing to accept 
and even advocate for government regulation. 418  His writings brought him national 
recognition. Cooley became one of the premier and most cited judges in the country. He 
was distinguished as a teacher and a visiting scholar in numerous universities including 
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Johns Hopkins and Harvard (Cooley received an honorary doctorate from Harvard, as 
part of the university’s 250th anniversary celebrations).419  
 Cooley’s judicial stance was that of a strict constructionist; for example he 
opposed the annexation of Hawaii since treatment of outlying colonies is not mentioned 
in the Constitution. He felt that a state’s government was defined by its constitution and 
legislatures had the right only to make laws that did not infringe on those constitutions. 
He was an advocate of strict separation of powers; in his view courts had no supervisory 
power over legislation and could only rule on a law based on the constitution, not on 
whether or not they liked the law (something that happened only too often according to 
Cooley). Most famously Cooley was the strong advocate of the rights of local 
government—municipal corporations. He opposed legislative control of private business, 
and monopolies that restricted competition; he favored private property and personal 
liberty.420  Despite this, Cooley was no friend of big business, especially the railroads. 
Cooley was well aware that the public “sentiment is adverse to the construction of 
railways by the state and the opinion is quite prevalent… they can be better managed,  
controlled and operated for public benefit in the hands of individuals.”421 In what has 
been seen as a controversial decision he had opposed state bonds to support building 
private railways in Michigan, which would have benefited only private corporations, in 
People v. Salem 20 Mic. 452 (1870). This judgment was possibly due to Michigan’s 
experience with the Central Railroad in the 1830s and 1840s (an experience that led to 
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the Michigan Constitution of 1850, which barred the state from involvement in internal 
improvement projects).422 Finally, he was an advocate of the working class; he felt that 
capital “needed awakening to the moral duties accompanying citizenship” and that this 
goal could be accomplished by “searching for moral or religious constraints on the 
conduct of employers.”423  
 His formal interest in the field of railroad regulation began in January of 1882  
 
when the Trunk Line Executive Committee, representing five eastern railways, asked him 
to serve on a committee investigating rate differentials. In his study of rates Cooley came 
to understand that there were shippers who benefited from the various rate schemes and 
that one solution would not please everyone (rates were what has come to be called a 
“zero-sum game”).Based on this, he wrote an article explaining why pools were a 
response to competition and he appears to have favored pooling.424 However, during his 
time with the ICC he opposed repealing the anti-pooling provision and setting minimum 
rates, either of which would have reduced competition.425  
Failing to get re-elected to his judgeship (probably for his support of Cleveland, a 
Democrat) Cooley resigned from the court in 1884 and returned to teaching. At the same 
time his interest in railroads increased. In the spring of 1886 he served as arbitrator for 
the Association of the Railroads of Kentucky, Tennessee and Arkansas; in December of 
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that year he was appointed receiver of the Wabash Railroad property west of the 
Mississippi. In 1887 Cooley was asked to be the first ICC commissioner. 
 In their first annual report, Cooley and the other members of the ICC reviewed the 
history of commerce regulation and affirmed the abuses of the railroads (this report is of 
particular significance because it provides a picture of the carriers at the time that the 
ICA was enacted). The Annual Report cites abuses of passes, the making and breaking of 
trade centers, ruinous competition between carriers, publication of confusing rate 
schedules, stock manipulations and arbitrary rate making, often made on local levels.  
Many of these abuses are reported to be shrouded in secrecy; there is little attempt to 
substantiate the charges or the extent of the abuses—no specific cases are cited in the 
report. While the report states the transactions would “in many cases” be held illegal 
under common law, “the proof was in general difficult.” It is mentioned that absolute 
rates were deemed less important by the shippers than access to equal, consistent, and 
published rates; the goal of the discriminated against shippers, as noted in the Report, was 
often to secure for themselves the preferred rates. Ultimately, the rivalry was between 
special interests, shippers and communities. Each was striving “to secure rates as will 
most benefit itself.”426 
 Of interest, the Report acknowledges that discrimination may have had positive 
effects on the lines and on the promotion of industries. Reasonable charges are discussed 
at length in the report, which starts the discussion by noting that none of the duties of the 
Commission “is more perplexing and difficult than that of passing upon complaints made 
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of rates as being unreasonable.”427 The complexities of the issues involved in the setting 
of reasonable rates and long-haul-short haul rates are reviewed at length, as is the impact 
of compliance with the ICA on competition.   A complicated interplay of factors beyond 
rates is presented in depth in the Report. In defense of railway rates, the ICC accepts that 
competition that results in unsustainably low rates may distort the public’s view of fair 
rates; that long-short rate charges may be reasonable and even beneficial in some 
circumstances, and likewise that rate disparities between lines can also be reasonable. 
The review of the issues in the Report, unlike some of the contemporary depictions of the 
lines, is not anti-railroad and is often sympathetic to their point-of-view. 428 Additionally, 
competition by water is recognized as a factor in the setting of rates.429  
 This report has much interesting information on the state of the lines in 1887. For 
instance, it reveals that between 500 and 1200 corporations were subject to the ICC (and 
it is pointed out the abuses of a limited number of lines may be “visited upon all roads,” 
but there is no indication of how many of the corporations were involved in dubious 
activity). Also the cost of building the lines was estimated as $7.25 billion with a 
payment of $80 million paid out in dividends (a 1.1 per cent return).430  
 Also, in defense of the carriers and the status quo, the report notes that it was the 
absence of regulation under common law that in good part that led to the problems.  
Some of the problems with the railways were stated to be due to the fact that “railroad 
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transportation was wholly unknown to common law”—the law simply did not exist—
leading to “indirect and abnormal law-making [by the corporations] exceedingly unequal 
and oftentimes oppressive.”431 Cooley’s and the ICC’s concern was that these practices 
would depress the weak and strengthen the strong at the same time that they “tended to 
fix in the public mind…that success in business was to be sought for in favoritism rather 
than in legitimate competition and enterprise.”432  Lack of regulation in railways 
permitted the carriers to choose their own routes, favoring certain locations. It also led to 
wasteful duplication of routes that resulted in destructive competition and discriminative. 
Finally the report acknowledges the issue of stock manipulation, but points out that since 
the railways were chartered by the states, correction of these abuses must be by state 
legislation rather that federal regulation.433 
 In conclusion, the First Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
would lead one to believe that the abuses of the carriers were so widespread and known 
that they required no substantiation, but also that in some cases the abuses may have 
justification in factors not evident to the public at large. There was something in the 
Report for everyone.  It emerges from the Report that the ICC and shippers were less 
interested in the issue of reasonable rates than they are in equal treatment.434  
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 According to Cooley and the ICC, as a public agency and common carriers, 
railroads owed an obligation to the public. Congress laid down rules of equity and 
equality to be followed in order to establish regulation and make certain that the public 
was served.  Equity, equality, and restoration of public confidence were Cooley’s ideals. 
Under Cooley’s direction the ICC attempted to enforce the provisions of the ICA, 
especially the anti-pooling and long-haul discrimination policies, while it acknowledged 
a responsibility to assure reasonable return for the investors.435 In 1889, the Commission 
made its first request to amend the ICA. Congress responded by extending its power and 
making the Commission independent of the Department of the Interior. Under Cooley’s 
leadership railroad safety was also made an issue of concern. In 1889, the Commission 
conducted a conference on the problem, which led to the Safety Appliance Act of 
1893.436  
 Cooley’s background as a judge (along with the fact that the four other initial 
commissioners were also lawyers) led to the courtroom character of the Commission’s 
proceedings. This led to the Commission addressing issues in a case-by-case manner. 
Other elements of Cooley’s “style” have been noted and “held out as a model for 
emulation.”437 The first was the attempt to resolve issues by mediation rather than 
adjudicative power; Cooley was a strong believer in the power of moral persuasion. This 
supported the Commission’s case-by-case approach—an approach that succeeded in 
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some cases. It was praised by some, condemned by others (who thought that a “cut and 
slash” approach was more likely to get everyone’s attention); in the long run, the case-by-
case approach, which in the opinion of Richard Stone, prevented the ICC “from 
developing a comprehensive railroad policy.” 438 It was Cooley’s hope that this approach 
would educate and reform both the railroads and the public. Second, Cooley developed 
the concept of a rule making process that later evolved into administrative due process. 
Under this due process the Commission’s findings based on facts would be considered 
final. Eventually, this concept became part of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. 
Finally, Cooley’s regulations and interpretations were presented with exceptional clarity 
and his integrity was acknowledged by all.  
 While Cooley favored mediation, a review of his history shows that he understood 
the problems and limitations of the ICC as ordained under the ICA and did not oppose a 
judicious show of judicial force when necessary. Ultimately, he felt the functions of the 
Commission should have included the ability to intervene in labor disputes, to develop 
policy and an enhanced power of regulation.439  
 Henry Carter Adams was another of Cooley’s legacies to the Commission. 
Adams, who had been a colleague of Cooley’s in Michigan, was a founder of the 
American Economic Association, a critic of laissez-faire economics and proponent of 
collective bargaining. He was a statistician who believed that statistical analysis and 
public education would solve the problems of the railways.  
 Following the death of his wife and due to his own poor health Cooley resigned  
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from the ICC in 1891. He was succeeded by William Morrison. 
 
  After Cooley left the ICC, the Court made statistical analysis the prime mission 
of the ICC.  It is difficult to determine how much the early successes of the ICC were due 
to the Cooley “style” because this was also an era of national prosperity. Rate 
discrimination was on the wane, published trunk-line rates were stable, and trunk-line net 
receipts and common-stock prices were up. Short-distance rates were cut in 1887 and 
1893 by ICC rules and average ton-mile rates declined on all lines (with the large 
shippers not receiving their customary share of the reductions).440 
 
The Development of the ICC and Its Relationship to the Courts 
Since the ICC had no enforcement authority of its own it depended on the courts 
to back its decisions.  The courts initially seem to have seen the ICC as an agency whose 
mission was only to collect statistics and to prepare preliminary reports, while it saw rate 
setting as the prerogative of the court.441 Court rulings dominated and diminished the ICC 
from 1887 until the start of the 20th century. 
While the ICC could set aside rates that were felt to be unreasonable, it did not 
have the power to enforce its rulings.442  The form of procedure required a formal 
complaint to be made (the ICC could not initiate actions), then a hearing was held in 
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which a decision was rendered. If the carrier chose not to comply with the decision it 
could appeal to a federal court and ultimately to the Supreme Court to force compliance. 
As a rule the Commission’s role was reduced to that of an originator of proceedings that 
usually took at least four years and frequently longer. When the cases were heard before 
the courts they could refuse to accept the factual materials presented to the Commission 
and they permitted the defendants to submit evidence that had not been presented in 
earlier hearings.  In essence this caused the cases to be presented de novo. As a result 
shippers and carriers paid little attention to the initial hearings or judgments by the ICC 
and their case presentations were limited.  Rulings of the Commission were simply 
ignored.443 Furthermore, the only party who could be awarded damages was the party 
bringing suit. The railroads typically had their contracts with the middlemen—the 
shippers—and not the producer/farmers. The shippers had adjusted the price they paid to 
the farmer based on the rate charged to them. Therefore, they—the middlemen— were 
usually not out money and had little incentive to sue.444 As a result the system was not 
working the way it was supposed to.  
Often witness testimony was required for the Commission to do its job, but 
witnesses were loathe to place themselves in jeopardy by their testimony. Among other 
concerns was that they felt the carriers would retaliate against them and their own 
liability under the law. The constitutional right of witnesses to refuse to testify was 
upheld by the Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock , 142, U. S. 547(1892). In 1893, 
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Congress passed the Compulsory Testimony Act, a law compelling witnesses to testify 
while protecting them from legal prosecution. This law was contested in several cases; it 
was not until 1896 that the Supreme Court gave the law its approval.  In Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U. S., 591, the Court gave the ICC the right to compel witnesses to testify.445 
In the “Social Circle” case the Court decided the courts could rule only on procedure not 
substance of a case.446 However, of the sixteen railroad cases that appeared before the 
Supreme Court from 1887 until 1905 brought under the ICA, fifteen were decided in 
favor of the railroads and against the Commission.447 
From its origin the ICC had the power to rule on whether or not a rate was 
reasonable—to encourage the correction of rate abuse. Early, the ICC believed that it had 
been given an implicit mission to set rates. Nevertheless in 1887 (the “Social Circle” 
case, C. N. O. and T. P. Railroad v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S., 184, 
and the “Maximum Freight Rate Cases,” Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, 
N. O. and T. P. Railroad, 167 U. S., 479 (1897) and in Texas Pacific Ry. Co. 167 U. S. 
479, 494 (1897), the Supreme Court definitively ruled that Congress had not given the 
ICC power to set rates either explicitly or implicitly.448 Based on this decision, the only 
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way that the Commission could influence rates was to declare one rate after another 
illegal until the carrier finally complied.  
One of the most important factors in the passage of the ICA was the issue of rate 
discrimination. Section four of the Act made it illegal for lines to discriminate in rates for 
transport of freight or passengers “under substantially similar circumstances and 
conditions.”449 Initially there were some attempts to correct the discrimination against 
short-haul rates. However, in 1892 the railroads found that by forming separate lines for 
long hauls and short hauls they could get around the issues of discrimination. This was 
initially accepted by the courts, but reversed in 1896.450 At the same time the Court 
supported the carriers by accepting the idea that competition should be considered a 
factor in the determination of the similarity in circumstances and conditions in setting 
rates. In 1897, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland Railway Co., 69 
Fed. 227 (1895), 74 Fed. 715 (1896), 168 U. S. 144 (1897), the Court addressed this 
issue.451 Under the Court’s interpretation, no two points were similar.  This ruling in 
effect barred the ICC from enforcing the ICA and led to the carriers filing for thousands 
of rate increases.452 In dissent, Justice Harlan wrote that the ICC has been shorn, by 
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judicial interpretation, of authority to do anything of an effective character.”453 This 
completely destroyed the Commission’s ability to determine rates. Also, the Supreme 
Court blocked the further attempts of the ICC to deal with rebating and long-haul/short-
haul rates.  
The most famous railroad discrimination case did not involve rates; the case was 
Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U. S. 537 (1896).  Under Cooley several racial discrimination 
cases came before the ICC; in each case the Commission’s ruling accepted “separate but 
equal” facilities to be acceptable.454 (Ida Wells, an African-American activist, had won a 
case against the Chesapeake, Ohio and Southwesterm Railroad in 1884 on the grounds 
that the railroad did not comply “with a Tennessee law mandating that railcars set aside 
for blacks be comparable to those reserved for whites,” but that verdict was reversed by 
the Tennessee Supreme Court.)455 The Plessy case followed a similar case that was 
thrown out because Daniel Desdunes, the passenger involved, had bought an interstate 
ticket and therefore could not be arrested for traveling in a “whites only” car under 
federal law. Mr. Plessy, who was one-eighth black (or alternatively seven-eighths white), 
had purchased a first-class ticket for intrastate travel in Louisiana and attempted to sit in a 
“whites-only” coach. He was denied access to the coach as a “member of the colored 
race.” When the case reached the Supreme Court, the justices confirmed the railroads 
right, under state law, to deny Plessy access to the whites-only car, thereby affirming the 
guidelines of “separate but equal.” Justice Henry Billings Brown, who wrote the majority 
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opinion, cited (among other cases), a Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling of 1849 that 
accepted segregated schools as constitutional. Only John Marshall Harlan, a former slave 
owner from Kentucky, dissented.456 He wrote: “It is therefore to be regretted that this 
high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached the 
conclusion that it is competent for the state to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their 
civil rights solely upon the basis of color.”457 The ICC accepted the Court’s ruling and 
never challenged the “separate but equal” polices of the “Jim Crow” laws. 
In 1889, in an attempt to mitigate the destructive rate wars, a group of bankers led 
by J. P. Morgan formed the Interstate Commerce Railway Association in order to reach 
agreements and stabilize rates. The Association failed, but it was not opposed by Cooley. 
During the 1890s the ICC accepted cartel arrangements that set rates, but did not 
apportion freight. In 1897, the Supreme Court ruled that these arrangements violated the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, further reducing the regulatory ability of the ICC.458   
Another major case, the Northern Securities Co., the Supreme Court’s decision 
impacted the relationship between the railroads and the ICC. Theodore Roosevelt wanted 
increased federal regulation of rail transportation companies and to accomplish this goal 
he started his campaign against the Northern Securities Co. in 1902. The Northern 
Securities Company was a result of a compromise between James Hill (backed by J. P. 
Morgan) and Edward Harriman (backed by Kuhn, Loeb and Co. and the Rockefeller 
interests). Both groups wanted control of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy line. At 
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first there was a ruinous battle for stock in the Northern Pacific which controlled the 
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy.  In the end, instead of competing they agreed to 
cooperate and formed a holding company, the Northern Securities Co. (in 1901) with 
joint control by Hill and Harriman. In 1902 the United States filed suit to breakup 
Northern Securities and in 1904 the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government 
under the Anti-trust law, five to four. Justice Homes, who had been carefully vetted and 
chosen by President Roosevelt, was among the dissenters. As a result Roosevelt was said 
to express his opinion of Holmes: “Out of a banana I could have carved a Justice with 
more backbone than that.”459 John Marshall Harlan voted with the five-judge majority.  
In reality, the decision had little impact on the way in which the lines were run.460 In 
1970, with the blessings of the Supreme Court the Great Northern, Northern Pacific 
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy and the Spokane, Portland and Seattle Railway formed 
the Burlington Northern Railroad.461 Even at the time of the decision to breakup the 
company some in the railroad community voiced their opposition. Balthasar Meyer, who 
would later become a commissioner, called for “legislation which will enable companies 
to act together under the law, as they now do quietly among themselves outside of the 
law.”462 
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As a result of these Court rulings and the ICC’s inherent weaknesses, the 
Commission came to be described as powerless as a “toothless tiger.”463 In essence the 
Court came to control the ICC.464 Despite the common notion that the courts were in 
opposition to the lines this is not a complete picture.  In many cases the court favored the 
carriers in cases where states attempted to reduce rates. In a unanimous opinion, written 
by Justice John M. Harlan in Smyth v. Ames, 171 U.  S. 361 (1898), the court ruled a 
Nebraska tariff, which would have reduced freight rates, unconstitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment as it took property without due process. The ruling in Smyth 
would be extended to other regulated industries. The ruling is seen as the Court’s support 
of the rights of property owners, and its desire to protect the national rail system and 
investment capital. 465 
 The attitude of the conservative Supreme Court majority during this period was 
articulated by Justice David J. Brewer (who served on the Court that ruled in Smyth). 
Brewer was a conservative believer in the rights of property and in the evils of 
governmental regulation of the economy. Brewer also defended the carriers against state- 
mandated rate reductions that he felt were confiscatory.466 He wrote the Supreme Court’s 
unanimous decision In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895). This opinion justified the federal 
government’s intervention in the Pullman Strike and Eugene Debs’ conviction for 
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contempt, based on the Commerce Clause; it favored the railroads and business and was 
seen as anti-labor.467 Brewer saw no need for commission experts as he felt that the Court 
was well suited to determine what was right and what was wrong. Brewer believed in an 
independent and vigorous judiciary.468 He also believed that the state and federal 
governments’ right to regulate the railways was limited by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution.469 Another Justice who was in favor of opposing the 
Commission’s attempts to extend its power was Oliver Wendell Holmes.470  
 Under the power of a conservative Court the primary role of the ICC was limited 
to a yearly status report, the gathering of statistics and establishing a uniform system for 
accounts.471  It had to rely primarily on publicity for enforcement.472  In addition to the 
lack of goal, lack authority to set rates and enforcement power, and judicial interference, 
a major issue at this time seems to be the lack of definition of internal structure and 
power (as has been noted earlier, a problem that the state commissions were unsuccessful 
in resolving). The interrelationship between executive, legislative, and judicial function is 
important in determining how a commission operates on a day-to-day manner, how it 
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interacts with those subject to its authority, and how its rules are to be seen as either court 
rulings or laws.473  
The passage of the Hepburn Act and the Mann-Elkins Act that helped to define 
the role of the ICC led to a narrow-review policy and liberalization of the Court’s 
“interpretation of the commission’s power.”474 In 1913 and 1914 two important 
consolidations of cases were decided: the Minnesota cases (Minnesota Rate Case 230 U. 
S. 352 (1913)) and the Shreveport cases (Houston East &West Texas Railway Co. v. 
United States 234 U. S. 342 (1914)).475 In essence these cases were extensions of the 
right of the central government to regulate intrastate commerce, based on the Commerce 
clause and on the grounds that such commerce would ultimately impact on interstate 
commerce. These cases demonstrate the changes in the power of the ICC. In the 
Minnesota decision the Supreme Court states “if the Federal control exists, it will have to 
be exercised through the ‘body created for that purpose’—the Interstate Commerce 
Commission” and the ICC was actively involved in the Shreveport Case.476  
Perhaps the most important result of this period was that the judicial experiences 
revealed to the Congress and the President the weaknesses of the ICC and the legislative 
fixes that were needed for the Commission to work effectively in the future in order to 
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achieve the goals set by the Progressive’s addenda that dominated in the beginning of the 
20th century.477  
 
The Development of the ICC and Federal Legislation; 1887-1918 
 The major impetus for Congressional intervention was the failure of the ICC and 
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890—in the face of pressure from the growing progressive  
movement and growing railroad consolidation.  In the mid-1890s one quarter of the lines,  
representing $2.5 billion , were in default and entering into consolidations.  By 1906 
seven groups (under control of different bankers) controlled two-thirds of  
America’s tracks.478 Interventions to strengthen the ICC by the Congress had the support 
of progressive politicians; the most noteworthy was President Theodore Roosevelt. The 
success of the ICC was important to those supporters of a strengthened central 
government and in line with progressive goals. If this first commission failed the old 
laissez-faire would continue; if, on the contrary, the agency proved virile and effective, 
the precedent for federal regulation would have been established, with the inevitable 
ultimate consequence of vastly increased federal administrative power.479 The major 
legislative acts impacting on the ICC from the passage of the ICA in 1887 to the federal 
takeover of the lines in 1918 will be reviewed.  
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 From its inception the Commission looked to Congress to clarify its role. Based 
on requests from the Commission, amending acts in 1889 give the ICC power to initiate 
inquiries on its own, enforce equal access to facilities, enforce prohibition of 
discrimination (by extending penal liability to shippers) and require uniformity in 
publication of rates. This act also abolished the supervision of the Secretary of the 
Interior, replacing it with the requirement that the ICC reported directly to Congress. In  
essence this made the Commission independent.480 Senator John Reagan, allegedly, 
promoted the bill to make the ICC more independent because of his mistrust of President  
Benjamin Harrison, who had been a railroad lawyer.481 An act of February 1893—the 
Compulsory Testimony Act—permitted the ICC to take testimony by deposition and 
protected witnesses, but it took the Court until 1896 to rule on the act.  
 In 1893, Congress extended the Commission’s mandate to cover safety issues. 
Based on the investigations and recommendations of the ICC and American Railway 
Association, the Congress passed the Safety Appliance Act of 1893, requiring self-
couplers, driving-wheel brakes and train brake systems, standardized drawbars and grab-
bars. However, at that time, the Congress rejected the ICC’s requests for other safety 
requirements.482   
 Following the Chicago strikes of 1894, a recommendation was made by the ICC 
to grant it the power to investigate labor disputes and enforce its recommendations. It was 
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not enacted, but an act of 1898 (the Erdman Law) designated the Chairman of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and the Commissioner of Labor to attempt to arbitrate 
controversies (when an attempt was made to make use of this act one year later it was a 
total failure). After 1907 this mechanism was used with increasing frequency, and in 
1913 a permanent board, the Board of Mediation and Conciliation, was established under 
the Newlands Act. This board removed disputes between the carriers and their employees 
from the jurisdiction of the Commission.483 
  In all of these cases the ICC had to work to get the support of Congress; in that 
sense it was not independent—control and regulation of the railroads came through acts 
passed by the federal government and court rulings, not the ICC.  
 Starting in 1903, based on the suggestions and support of the ICC, Congress 
began to pass several laws that broadened the Safety Appliance Act of 1893. These laws 
were primarily designed to increase the safety of travel and protect employees.  Some of 
the laws (per Bernhardt) had “rules and instructions with such modifications as the 
commission might require” and “such rules after approval by the commission were to 
become obligatory;”also, “the commission was made the final court of appeal.”484 In 
1901, the Accident Reports Act was passed, which was designed to throw light on the 
causes of accidents. When it was suggested that excessive work hours were a cause of the 
accidents the Hours of Service Act of 1907 was passed and the execution of the act was 
assigned to the ICC. Based on investigation the Commission also recommended block 
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signaling and automatic control of trains (which were not put in place despite the 
Commission’s report). An act in 1908 required the Commission be aware of appliances 
and systems to promote railroad safety.485 All of these actions and laws were the result of 
suggestions, interactions and cooperative actions between the Congress and ICC.  
 At the end of the century Senator Cullom and Senator William Chandler (a 
Republican, from New Hampshire) supported by the Industrial Commission and ICC 
introduced several bills to strengthen the rate setting power of the ICC and expedite 
judicial review; however, no action was taken.486 Until 1906 the Congress was busy with 
currency legislation, the Spanish American War, pure food and trust problems and did 
not act on bills requested by the ICC. At the same time railroad issues were changing, 
rates were climbing, the lines were consolidating and being absorbed into large industrial 
combinations.487 
 One of the first issues to be dealt with in the new century was the long delay in 
getting ICC cases in front of federal courts. This was addressed in the Expediting Act of 
1903. Through this act the Attorney General could file a certificate stating that an ICC 
case had general public importance and it would be given priority in the federal system 
up to the Supreme Court.488 Also in 1903, in response and with the support of the 
carriers, the Elkins amendment was passed by Congress to end rebates and individual 
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discrimination (free passes). The Act required adherence to published rates. It made the 
railroad corporations, shippers and their agents liable to financial penalties for deviating 
from published rates, but eliminated imprisonment as a punishment. What the Elkins Act 
did not do was to assure that the rates published and charged by the railroads were  
reasonable.489 Under this amendment the ICC still had to petition a circuit court of the 
United States when it had reasonable belief that a carrier was not conforming to 
published tariffs. It was made the duty of the district attorneys or the Attorney General 
“to institute and prosecute such proceedings.”490  This amendment did little to change the 
state of the ICC. As already noted the amendment led the lines to invent innovative ways 
of avoiding the law.491 
 Under pressure from President Roosevelt, who had made railroad regulation a 
priority, in 1906 Congress overwhelmingly passed the Hepburn bill, which expanded the 
scope and authority of the ICC for the first time.492  This act was passed despite railroad 
opposition with strong popular and political support. The Hepburn bill amended the ICA 
of 1887. Most importantly, the Commission was given the power to determine and 
enforce maximum rates and charges for services. It also increased Commission 
membership from five to seven, extended the term of office to seven years, made the ICA 
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applicable to express companies, sleeping-car companies, and oil pipe lines. Part rail and 
part water transportation was covered and the terms “railroad” and “transportation” were 
defined and broadened. Free passes, with exceptions that interestingly included attorneys 
at law, were eliminated. Both the corporations and individual carriers and shippers could 
be prosecuted for violations. The bill made it harder for the carriers to ignore the ICC and 
for courts to set aside the ICC’s orders. When a shipper appealed a sanction, the burden 
of proof was on the carrier.  Also the law required access to all books of the companies 
and made it illegal for the companies to keep records not approved by the Commission. 
The new law permitted the Commission to change freight classifications and set up 
required standard accounting systems. The “commodity clause” that was a part of the 
new law prohibited a company from carrying any good that it manufactured, except for 
lumber or products necessary for its own use. This bill clearly expresses the will and 
goals of the Congress that the Commission was to monitor and enforce; it also 
strengthened the judicial role of the Commission. From the passage of the Act the rulings 
of the Commission were effective from the date of the decrees unless reversed by a court 
decision; the rulings of the Commission were to be enforced.  Finally, the Act extends to 
the commissions the authority to set and enforce standards of its own without going back 
to Congress (particularly in the reports and statistics that it could require from the 
common carriers). The Act did not give the commission the power to initiate actions on 
its own.493  The Act was passed with the Allison Amendment, which left the extent of 
judicial review undetermined and provided for quick appeal to the Supreme Court (which 
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ultimately adopted a narrow review policy). It was with the passage of the Hepburn Act 
that the ICC became “an independent regulatory commission with quasi-legislative, 
executive and judicial powers” and one of the most important agencies in the United 
States government.494  
 This issue of the segregation of powers was extensively discussed at the time the 
Hepburn Act was debated. Railroad interests and their supporters strongly opposed the 
Act based on the fact that it would be “a detective agency, a prosecuting attorney, and a 
lord high executioner.”495 Remedies were put forth, particularly an independent 
commerce court, but this was not enacted at the time the Hepburn Act was passed. 
 Several of the judicial decisions highlighted defects of the law. The Supreme 
Court quickly recognized fully “the constitutionality of the free and full exercise of 
legislative power delegated by Congress beyond the power of the court to review.”496 Its 
most important defect was the lack of ability to suspend increases prior to their taking 
effect. Action in these cases was left to the Attorney General.  One immediate 
consequence of the Act was a significant increase in the number of cases promulgated by 
the increase in governmental control.497 
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 After the passage of the Hepburn Act, formal complaints to the ICC increased 
from 65 in 1905 to 1,097 in 1909 and from 503 informal complaints in 1905 to about 
4,500 informal complaints in 1909.498 
 The next major legislation that impacted the ICC and railways was the Mann-
Elkins law of 1910. Through this act jurisdiction of the ICC was extended to include 
telegraph services and telephone and cable companies. It gave the Commission power to 
suspend rate changes for up to ten months pending investigation, made the carriers 
responsible for proving the reasonableness of rate increases and also original rates, and 
eliminated the words “under substantially similar circumstances and conditions” from 
Section 4 of the original ICA. The Act gave the ICC the ability to change freight 
classifications. Hearings were required to lower rates, and lower compensation for 
through traffic was prohibited. Lowering rates in response to competition from water 
transport was to require a hearing. The long-short haul clause was modified to restore the 
control to the ICC. Importantly the Commission was granted the right to institute its own 
inquiries without a formal complaint. The Mann-Elkins Act also provided for a 
Commerce Court. Not included in the final law were provisions for legalization of traffic 
agreements or the supervision of railroad capitalization.499  
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 The function of this Commerce Court, established at the recommendation of 
President Taft, was to alleviate congestion in the court system and to provide for an 
impartial final review of ICC decisions.  In this regard the formation of the Commerce 
Court was a remedy for the merger of powers in the ICC. Commission orders were to be 
defended in front of the Commerce Court by the Attorney General and it left open the 
possibility that the Commission could also be represented by its own lawyers. 
Progressives opposed the court fearing that it would limit the ICC.500 The role of the 
Attorney General was hotly debated as it was felt that requiring the Attorney General to 
advocate for the ICC jeopardized its independence and placed it under the political 
control of the executive branch.501 This court, which consisted of five judges, was to deal 
with cases based on the orders of the ICC that did not involve forfeiture, penalty, or 
criminal punishment, suits brought under the Elkins Act and suits that compelled the 
keeping of records and reports, or suits that compelled movement of traffic or furnishing 
of facilities. In 1913, Martin Knapp, former ICC Chairman and then Commerce Court 
judge expressed his opinion that [t]he shipper is not always the underdog. Too often it 
happens that he is dishonest and that the carrier is wronged.”502 However, as noted by 
Felix Frankfurter, the Court could not afford its “indifference to popular sentiment.”503 
The Commerce Court reversed the ICC in 20 of 27 cases, while the United States 
Supreme Court reversed the Commerce Court in four of the first decisions appealed to it 
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in 1913 (and later ten of twelve). Whether or not the Court was successful and beneficial 
was debated. 504 It is generally felt that the Commerce Court had favored the carriers too 
strongly. The Progressive Party platform stated “in order that the power of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission to protect the people may not be impaired or destroyed, we 
demand the abolition of the Commerce court.”505 As a consequence, despite a favorable 
report from the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce and strong support from 
President Taft, the Court’s funding was not renewed by Congress and its jurisdiction was 
transferred to the federal courts, which were now seen as more liberal in its interpretation 
of the Commission’s powers.506 
 After the Elkins Act, the federal courts respected the Commission’s findings on 
facts. With the elimination of the “similar circumstances and conditions” phrase, the 
Supreme Court granted the ICC the right to consider competition in rate setting.  
Additionally the court “did not hold valid the objection…the law delegated legislative 
power to the commission.”507  
 By the Panama Canal act of 1912, the ICC was granted additional power to 
regulate competition. Under this act, the railroads could not control or operate steamship 
companies going through the Panama Canal or water traffic elsewhere that would 
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compete with railroads for traffic. It could be ruled acceptable only if such competition 
was in the interest of the public.508  
 A long-standing problem for the determination of rates and a fair rate of return to  
investors was the lack of a precise valuation of the railroads. A congressional act of 1913 
(based on La Folette’s view that rates should be based on the actual value of the 
railroads) directed the ICC to value the property of all common carriers. The role of the 
ICC in this valuation was not only to ascertain value but to report on the principles and 
theories of railroad evaluation. As pointed out by Pierce Butler in 1915 (while working as 
a railroad attorney, and prior to his serving on the Supreme Court), the purpose of the 
valuation was not limited to rate setting but included taxation, valuation of securities, and 
use as a guide to future legislation. As a result the ICC spent $45 million and the railroads 
$138 million collecting statistics in a decades-long process determining those values; the 
complexity and issues of the evaluation are discussed by Butler.509 The assessment, when 
finally completed by the ICC’s Bureau of Valuation after twenty years, supported the 
railroad’s positions—it showed the railroads were not overcapitalized, that dividends on 
watered stock did not mask excess profits, and that the carriers were not getting fabulous 
returns on their investments.510 
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 The Commission was given jurisdiction to administer those provisions of the 
Clayton Act in 1914 that applied to the carriers.511 In part the Clayton Act was passed in 
response to the Supreme Court’s unanimous decisions: In Re Debs 158 U. S.  564 (1895) 
and the Danbury Hatters’ Case (Lowe v. Lawlor 208 U. S. 274 (1908)), cases in which 
the Court found that the Sherman Act applied to labor and therefore making boycotts 
across state lines illegal under U. S. law. (In fact the Clayton Act was plagued by 
ambiguity and the unions won exemption from antitrust litigation only in the  
late1930s.)512 
 Prior to the onset of World War I the Commission suggested legislation to: 
increase its membership and form subdivisions to deal with specific issues, authority to 
resolve conflicts  between state and interstate rates, and authority to control the 
maintenance and operation of the physical properties of the carriers.  It also sought to 
declare all current rates reasonable and require justification only for rate increases (based 
on the principle of English law), in order that energies best be utilized. Additionally, 
legislation was recommended to permit joint ownership of rail and water lines (even if 
that reduced competition) as long as it served the public interest. These recommendations 
were made at a time when rail systems were having difficulty keeping up with the 
demands on the lines that were made by the war, which had started in Europe. They were 
having problems accessing required capital for maintenance and new equipment and were 
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faced with a reduction in net incomes despite increased gross revenues. The result was 
that, in July 1916, a joint subcommittee consisting of members of the Senate Committee 
on Interstate Commerce and the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
was authorized to investigate.  The committee began hearings in November of 1916 and 
had not finished its report at the time the government assumed control of the railroads in 
December 1917.  An act of August 1916 gave the President the power to take possession  
and assume control of any transportation system in a time of emergency. 513  
 Additional legislation in 1916 impacted the railroads. Growth in rail workers 
unions led to increases in wages and costs to the carriers. When the unions pushed for the 
eight-hour day the carriers refused a compromise put forward by President Wilson to 
grant the union demands in order to get rate increases. As a result, Congress passed the 
Adamson Act of 1916 to legislate the eight-hour day for railroad workers. 514 
 The Car-Service Act of May 1917 gave the Commission the right to control the  
movements and use of cars and to form a “Commission on Car Service.” In August of 
1917 in response to the Commission’s requests (see above) some of the ICC’s concerns 
were addressed. The Commission was enlarged to nine members and it was permitted to 
divide into subdivisions each with the power to act subject to review by the entire 
Commission. At this time the ICC developed bureaus in which decision making was 
shifted from commissioners to examiners (a process that had started in 1906). This 
ultimately led weaker commissioners to simply ratify the views of examiners. The same 
Act legalized existing rates until January 1, 1920 and required approval for any future 
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increases. 515 Another act was passed in August of 1917. This act gave the President the 
right, in time of war, to direct those shipments that he deemed necessary. It also  
directed the Commission to carry out the orders of the President and prioritize the 
shipments (something that proved to be a failure).516 As the transportation situation 
worsened, the ICC recommended the carriers to be operated under a unified management. 
On December 28, 1917, the federal government took over the railroads for the duration of 
the war under Director General William McAdoo (who had been Wilson’s campaign 
manager and Secretary of the Treasury and was Wilson’s son-in-law). 
 After the Standard Time Zone Act of 1918, the ICC was given the power to define  
the time zone boundaries.517  
 In a provision of March 1918, the ICC was directed to determine the operating 
costs of the carriers for the three years ending on June 30, 1917, in order to set 
compensation for the railways. During the war the Commission worked to advise the 
government on rates, to respond to railroad requests to modify rates, to advise the 
President and Director General McAdoo on reasonable rates and in a general advisory 
capacity.518  
 This review of the relationship between the Interstate Commerce Commission and 
the U. S. legislature, from 1887 until 1918, traces the growth of the Commission’s 
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authority and the evolution of its structure under the control of the Congress. Presidents 
varied in their relationship to the ICC.  They were able to, if inclined, to exert their will 
through the Congress and their ability to appoint its commissioners. President McKinley 
had little interest in the ICC; Roosevelt used the Congress to promote his progressive 
agenda, particularly in the Hepburn Act.  The Commerce Court came into its brief 
existence under pressure from President Taft.  Because of these developments, and 
despite the opposition of the railroads and the obstruction of the United States Supreme 
Court, the commission was able to control the largest industry in the country based on 
political support.519 This review shows that during this period the ICC, while an 
independent agency, was very much under the control of the Presidents (when they chose 
to exert their authority) and Congress, and not the railroads. The ICC used its newly 
minted authority to control the lines.  Railroad regulation happened despite the opposition 
of the carriers.  
 
The Development of the Interstate Commerce Commission; Discussion 
 When the ICA was passed in 1887 it was “clearly recognized that the important 
problem of federal railroad regulation would have to be solved by trial and error.” 520This 
review confirms Bernhardt’s opinion that in the end the legislative changes led to more  
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stringent regulation than contemplated by the original Act, or by Thomas Cooley.521 As 
described in the origination section of this thesis, the ICA and ICC came into existence 
due to historical and political pressures, technological advances, and economic 
developments that demanded change and reform in the relationship between the 
government and emerging industrial components of society. The demand was for reform; 
the problem was how to change this demand into “regulatory policy and administrative 
operation.”522 Despite the advantages of independent commissions cited in the 
conclusions of the origination section of this thesis, critics found that there were many 
issues or problems with commissions.523 These issues, raised in the initial debate over the 
incorporation of the commission form in the ICA, as well as issues that arose later, will 
be discussed. It was the combination of the intrinsic assets of the Commission and the 
attempts to correct its flaws that shaped the ICC and its subsequent history.  
 One of the most serious problems was the provision in the act that disqualified 
from commission membership those having immediate railroad connections. Per Mr. 
Gosvenor of Ohio: “Men who know anything about this business upon which the 
commission is to embark are to be disbarred from appointment.”524  
 Inability to avoid political entanglement is another of these flaws. A major goal of 
the progressive movement that dominated the early part of the 20th century was to distant  
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governmental control from politics; a major belief was that this could be accomplished 
through regulatory agencies or commissions. The independent commission was to be the 
solution, an entity that was above politics, its purity guaranteed by nonpartisan experts. 
One of the chief supporters of this view of commissions was Louis Brandeis.525 Critics 
suggested that this was naïve. They felt that the political facts of life were largely ignored 
by the advocates of the commissions and that the regulatory agencies would be 
dominated by “well-organized private [or public] groups seeking to identify their 
interests with the general welfare.”526 While regulatory capture (see below) of the 
commission by economic interests has been the subject of much interest, political capture 
of the commissions and its potential for corruption seems to have attracted less attention. 
The progressive view ignores the basic fact that while politicians may be true believers, 
even progressive politicians have to be elected in order to exert power. As a consequence, 
politicians do what they feel is necessary to appease their constituents, which is what 
many politicians felt they were elected to do. Additionally, as noted by Huntington, “to 
remain viable over a period of time, an agency must adjust its sources of support so as to 
correspond with changes in the strength of their political pressures.”527 There is little that 
is pure, and no lack of self–interest either on the part of the politicians or the bureaucrats. 
Roosevelt and his progressive allies, as noted, were highly responsive to their constituent 
base. The demise of the Commerce Court is one example. Stone states, “the Commerce 
Court is not much more than a footnote to history,” demonstrating the growing power of 
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the ICC.528 His dismissal misses the important role of political, and especially progressive 
pressure, exerted to control the ICC and railroads. Congress stopped its funding simply 
because it felt the Court favored the carriers. In another example the ICC accepted value-
of service pricing. Under value-of-service pricing the lines charged more for carrying 
expensive finished goods than for raw materials. Shipping rates for bulk goods such as 
farm produce, soap, flour, salt, and fertilizer were lower than the rates for manufactured 
goods. As a result, certain industries and locales were promoted at the expense of others. 
The consequence was that value-of-service pricing increased the cost of the finished 
goods that all consumers purchased, shifting a cost away from producers of raw materials 
onto others. Neither the ICC nor the progressives addressed this issue, or its 
discrimination. The progressives accepted cost-of-value pricing despite its consequences 
and discrimination because of its benefits for their constituents and their own political 
agenda.529 Progressive politicians were not, and many would argue should not have been, 
interested in righting the wrongs that did not help their constituents, or wrongs that were 
not recognized or promoted by their agenda; they are not interested in the common 
welfare. In fact the progressives were most interested in obtaining discriminatory freight 
rates on farm products and necessities for their special interest groups. The politicians 
and members of the Commission under their influence were more responsive to these 
vocal constituent groups than to the very real needs of the carriers and country.530  
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 An issue related to political control of an agency is control of a regulatory body 
by the industry that it was supposed to control or regulate—regulatory capture. This was 
a major concern voiced by Reagan and others concerning commissions. Reagan was 
worried that based on their wealth and power the carriers had the “capacity to appoint 
such men as would serve their purposes.”531  Herbert Croly, a progressive political 
thinker, expressed his concern that the railroads were “big enough to control the public 
officials whose duty it was to supervise them.”532 Likewise, Charles Francis Adams, Jr. 
recognized the power of the carriers to control commissions and legislatures; nevertheless 
he favored the regulatory commission.533 While regulatory capture may have occurred in 
the past and may have been true in other fields, the evidence revealed for regulatory 
takeover of the ICC by the railroads is at best weak for the time period 1887-1918. The 
subsequent relationship between the ICC and railroads, in my opinion, is less dominance 
of the ICC by the railroads than a symbiotic relationship between the two that developed 
when the ICC and carriers were both economically and politically weakened.534 This is a 
stage of development not considered by Bernstein. Theodore Roosevelt’s desire and 
success in establishing a mechanism for control over the railroads, as seen in his support 
for the Hepburn Act, indicates that the government rather than the railroads was the 
dominate power in the formation and directing the ICC.  This review shows that by the 
start of the First World War despite all of the efforts and opposition of the railroads, the 
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Commission’s power and influence over the railways had increased enormously. Even 
the increases in rates, that were granted to the carriers in the pre-war years starting in 
1915, which were justified by the economic realities, were too little too late.   
  Another problem that was of concern was that the job of railroad regulation 
would prove to be too large and beyond the capacity of the Commission, leading to delay  
of effective regulation.535  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (1910) wrote that the 
“Commission naturally is always trying to extend its power.”536 As the reach of the ICC 
grew, its staff grew.  There were five commissioners in 1887 and nine commissioners in 
1917. In 1887 the Commission had eight clerks and two messengers; in1890 the staff of 
the ICC was 104; in 1905 the staff was 178; in 1907 the staff was 330, and in 1909 it had 
grown to 527. By 1930 the commission had 2,252 employees in 13 subdivisions deciding 
20,553 matters with 4,351 registered lawyers. In the 1940s it had eleven commissioners, 
2,700 employees and was the largest employer of administrative judges in the 
government.537 
 With the Act of 1917, the ICC was divided into divisions and bureaus. During this 
time, decision making and the preparation of reports was shifted from the commissioners 
to examiners (a process that had started as early as 1906). Some of the commissioners 
still decided issues, but later commissioners tended to rubberstamp their staffs; a 
bureaucracy was coming into being.538  
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 This history also demonstrates that very early on, in part due to the provision that  
prevented anyone with any railroad connection from appointment to the Commission, the 
ICC was taken over by lawyers (whose connections with shippers, railroads, or state 
commission did not seem to bar them). Even before the passage of the ICA, commenting 
on the existing state commissions, Charles Francis Adams (himself an attorney) noted for 
the appointment of state commissioners “any antecedent familiarity with the railroad 
system [was regarded] as a total disqualification.”539 He continued, the commissioners  
 ever reflected the angry complexion of the movement out of which they had 
 originated. They were where they were, not to study a difficult problem and to 
 guide their steps by the light of investigation...On the contrary they were there to 
 prosecute. The test of their performance of duty was to be sought in the degree of 
 hostility they manifested to the railroad corporations.540  
 
From the very beginning the legalistic tone of the Commission was set by Thomas 
Cooley, a renowned judge, and the four other initial commissioners who were also 
lawyers as were many of their successors.541  As a result, legal issues and proceedings 
quickly came to dominate the Commission’s agenda. In 1906, Herbert Croly discussed 
prominence of lawyers in American politics noting “that a government by law is not only 
government by lawyers, but is a government in the interest of litigation.” 542 
Consequently, the members of the Commission lacked business experience and were 
more interested in what lawyers do, eliminating abuses and eradicating conflicts through 
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the medium of litigation.543 Croly felt that commissions should be promoters of social 
welfare; they should assert public interests and take “a more positive approach toward the  
formulation of regulatory policy.”544 (Admittedly, this historical review shows that the 
Congress and ICC did lead innovation in some fields, especially in work rules and in 
industrial safety, but also that many of the innovations that promoted safety and increased 
efficiency came from the carriers themselves.) Ultimately the ICC remained true to the 
Cooley tradition in regard to the methods of procedure, and continued to judge on a case-
by-case basis; it did not use its authority to develop broad principles of regulation.545 
Another flaw of the ICC to be considered is the piecemeal and haphazard development of 
both the regulation of business and the structure of the Commission. Consequently, in the 
absence of a firm directive, the ICC was especially vulnerable to the political, legal, and 
bureaucratic influences that shaped it.546 As the ever insightful Croley put it, “the 
commission would divide responsibility for business decisions between public and 
private officials and would be driven to harmful interference with business efficiency” 
(efficiency was always a progressive goal).547 Likewise, Bernhardt felt that a defect of the 
regulatory system, as it came into being, was that it led to a diffusion of responsibility for 
management of “the carriers between law makers, administrative commission and 
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railroad executives.”548 This lack of defined authority also permitted the states to pass 
regulations that interfered with interstate commerce by increasing expenses of interstate 
commerce (another topic for further investigation).549 
 Finally it should be noted that neither the original ICA nor any of the acts that 
followed it gave the ICC authority over roads, water (when not related to railways), or air 
transportation. This was to have a significant impact in the 20th century in shaping the 
relationship between the carriers and the ICC.  
 Despite all of the problems that seem inherent to the Commission, during the 
period between 1887 and 1918 the ICC had changed from a “toothless tiger” to an agency 
of considerable power and influence. 
 It is time to address the third and fourth questions that have been raised about the 
structure, the determinant pressures that defined the commission’s goals and the reason 
for the choice of the commission model.  The answers to these questions are to be found 
in the current review of the Commission’s history: its relationships to the railroads and 
government, the inherent problems in the form of the commissions and its initial failures. 
The Commission’s survival was accomplished by the redefinition of the mission, 
authority, the structure and procedures of the Commission. 
 The authority of commissioners, and consequently the structure of the ICC was a 
concern of the congressional leaders who debated the ICA. The lack of structural 
definition and the limited power initially granted under the ICA, which led to much 
vagueness about the ICA’s goals and uncertainty about the “independence” of the  
                                                     
 548 Bernhardt, The Interstate Commerce Commission, 43. 
 
 549 Bernhardt, The Interstate Commerce Commission, 46-47. 
 
  
161 
 
Commission was contributory.550 For instance, initially when the constitutional question 
of the delegation of judicial powers to the Commission first arose it was answered by 
noting the Commission did not have final authority and it decisions would be subjected to 
court review.551 Another constitutional question arose later when the Hepburn Act was 
debated; this was whether or not the commission could set rates. While the Court had 
indicated that it could, opponents of the Hepburn Act felt that in that Act Congress had 
delegated the right to set rates, a legislative power, to the Commission, but under the 
Constitution legislative power could not be delegated.  Proponents countered by stating 
that the Congress had set the rates by requiring that they should not be unjust or 
unreasonable and the Commission was only acting as an agent of its will.552 Ultimately, 
as the structure of the Commission evolved under the direction of the Congress and it 
freed itself of external judicial oversight it became a quasi- administrative, quasi-judicial, 
and quasi-legislative body within the executive branch of government. In this sense it is a 
repudiation of the American ethic of the doctrine of the separation of powers, which is  
the basis of the tripartite government. 553  
 Procedurally the Commission followed two paths. The first was set by the states’ 
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commissions and Cooley. It became an organ for resolution of disputes and to enforce 
edicts. The Commission continued to be dominated by lawyers and legal procedure. The 
second procedural path was the increase in bureaucracy, as the areas of responsibility 
broadened and workloads increased, the work of the Commission was shifted to 
underlings working within the confines of the ICC.  
 The Commission had the power that was granted to it by the government and 
politicians. The Commission was independent as long as it carried out the dictates of 
Congress and the President expressed through Congress, or the Congress responded to its 
requests for expansion of power, personnel, and jurisdiction. The Commission had 
broken free of external judicial review except in cases of Constitutional issues. Its 
relationship with the court changed from the one expressed by Justice Harlan in 1897: “it 
has been shorn by judicial interpretation of authority to do anything of an effective 
character,” to Holmes’ 1910: “I have written some decisions limiting it (by constructions 
of statutes only).”554 It was not directly answerable to the needs of the public, 
transportation at large, or the needs of the carriers. In short, this review shows that in the 
long run the ICC came under control of the electorate via the Congress (most clearly seen 
in the history of the Commerce Court) and the ballot box, despite the judiciary the 
powerful money interests of the railroads and the real needs of the country—a lesson that 
seems to have been overlooked. 
 This review indicates that, in the early period of the Commission’s existence, the 
original intent and need was to establish some level of control over the railways. As time 
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progressed the ICC came to be an arm of governmental control in order to actuate 
political agendas in a rapidly changing country.  Ultimately, the ICC permitted both the 
Congress and the President to centralize power, unite the country and strengthen 
Washington. Industrial improvement was low on their list. The ICC strengthened the 
influence of the central government; Congress’ need of specialized resources caused it to 
help the commissions to grow. It has also been noted that the commission model located 
the commissions between the public and Congress—the commissions could buffer the 
Congress from public demands and dissatisfaction. The fact that the commission model 
was successful in accomplishing these goals of government is another reason why it was 
perpetuated. When Woodrow Wilson (as Theodore Roosevelt had done) was looking to 
promote his agenda, on the counsel of Brandeis he opted for commissions. Commissions 
had the power and the merit of regulating industry and avoiding the need for direct 
legislative intervention.555 This review gives little to support the widely held idea of the 
enormous power that the railroads exerted over the government (although they did try 
their best).  During the period from 1887 until 1918 the carriers dominated neither the 
Commission nor the government.  In fact this research indicates that both came to 
dominate the railroads.   
 At the conclusion of The Octopus, Norris’s hero comes to see the railroads as a  
force that cannot be stopped or controlled.556 The history of the ICC from 1887 to 1918,  
shows him to be wrong. The changes and growth of the railroads, and by implication the  
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industrialization of the United States and the changes in the social structure of America, 
which had increased in size and complexity, were in fact unstoppable, but not 
uncontrollable. The mechanism of that political and governmental control would be 
agencies or commissions, which developed on the model of the ICC in order to control 
not only industry but the social aspects of life.  In 1906 the Pure Food and Drug Act was 
passed, in 1913 the Federal Reserve Act was passed and the Sixteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution was ratified leading to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in 1914 the Federal 
Trade Act was passed, and in 1916, The Shipping Board Act.  
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V 
Conclusions and Issues for Further Research 
 
To reiterate, the origination section of this thesis demonstrates that that the ICA 
and ICC did not originate in the 1870s and 1888s as much as the 1780s. It was the 
combined result of the need to address the complexity of merging industries, 
strengthening of the power of the central government over both industry and state 
governments, and a populist response to a perceived or real need to regulate the railroads. 
The development section of the thesis clearly demonstrates that despite fears of the times 
and the beliefs of later historians, regulatory capture of agencies was not intrinsic to the 
early evolution of the ICC—the agencies, when supported by government and politicians, 
clearly dominated the railroads to achieve their aims, even to the point of near destruction 
of the lines.  The development of the commission was in response to inherent problems in 
that form and its needs to respond to the needs of government and provide government 
the services it needed.  
1) Two main streams of historical research were consulted and converged in the 
current thesis. One was the history of the development of railroad 
transportation in the United States. Noteworthy is that the mention of the ICC 
in these histories is very sparse and limited.  The other was the history of the 
ICC; these histories all considered the role of the railroads in the origin and 
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development of the ICC extensively. While this thesis attempts to merge these 
approaches there is room for further reconciliation. 
 
2) Early on, railroads were chartered and through their charter came to be 
regulated by the states. Even after the ICA and ICC and during the 
developmental phase of the ICC state charters and commissions continued to 
play an important role in rail transport.557 The states continued to have 
railroad commissions, some of which were very important locally and 
nationally (Texas). This may be seen as a consequence of Madison’s view that 
provided for dual protection for individual rights.558 State commissions have 
been mentioned at several points in the thesis and further research on the 
interrelationship and interactions between state and federal railroad regulation 
is needed. Related is the role the ICC played in asserting federal authority 
over the states after the period of reconstruction and during redemption.  
 
 
3) In the “First Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission” the 
history of modes of transportation in the United States was reviewed; there 
were three in 1887: navigable waters and oceans, land commerce via roads 
and highways, and railroads. The ICA did not provide for the ICC to regulate 
roads even when they crossed state lines. The reason was lack of traffic due to 
                                                     
 557 “The First Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission,” 2-4, 9-10. 
 
 558 Campbell, The Growth of American Government, 13 
 
  
167 
 
the poor condition of the roads along with the expense and delay associated 
with highway transportation. The invention and dissemination of the bicycle 
in the 1880s changed the condition of the roadways. Before the automobile, 
bicyclists formed the League of American Wheelmen to push for better roads. 
Better roads were a plank in the 1885 Populist Party platform. As a result of 
the road lobby, New Jersey passed the State Aid Act in 1891 and at the 
national level the Office of Road Inquiry was created in 1893. In was not until 
1896 that the Duryea Motor Wagon Company of Springfield, Massachusetts, 
built the first production automobile in the United States.559 From the 
beginning of the 20th century, cars and trucks challenged and then dominated 
land transportation, quickly followed by airplanes especially for passenger and 
fast freight transport. These changes and the way in which they impacted the 
ICC, the carriers and their interrelationship is a topic that needs further 
research.  
 
4) Growth of the federal government is often seen as a result of welfare and 
entitlement policies—expansion of government in social spheres. This thesis 
provides evidence that shows provisions for the growth of federal authority  
were part of an agenda formalized in the Constitution.560  The rapid growth in 
size and power of the ICC over the period studied is indicative of the growth 
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of government authority long before the New Deal and is part of a continuum 
of that growth that started in the late 19th century with the ICC. In this regard 
it is interesting that the size of the federal government, as measured by per 
cent of Gross National Product spent on government (admittedly not the only 
way to measure government size) grew only from 7.3 per cent to 7.5 per cent 
between 1870 and 1913.561 It may be that the growth in size, scope, and power 
of government agencies preceded the growth of cost in government, or that 
GNP may in fact not be a good measure.  Study of the ICC, and the rise of 
other independent agencies, could be used to examine government growth 
secondary to increased technological and industrial complexity, prior to the 
era of increase in social programs. 
 
5) The major premises that led to the ICA and ICC was that railway rates were 
unequal, discriminatory, and unreasonable. These realities are accepted, 
uncritically, by virtually every author cited in this work. The sole exception is 
James W. Ely, Jr.  In the current review a few cases of unequal rates were 
cited in passing without discussion of what may have led to the inequalities, 
but in general substantiation is lacking.  Ely presents, in my opinion, a 
balanced view 
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      Historians would do well to look with a critical eye at allegations of rate 
 abuses by the railroads.  Although the Progressives tended to accept these 
 complaints at face value, one should bear in mind that merchants and 
 farmers had their own economic agenda, and were quick to invoke the 
 “public interest” as a cloak. Still rail critics voiced legitimate concerns. 
 Many of the charges flung at the railroads were overstated but not entirely 
 untrue.562  
 
(My only issue with Ely is that he does not note the self-interests of the 
politicians.)  The First Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission does 
discuss the many issues that may have led to discriminatory rates and the 
difficulties in determining reasonable rates. It also notes that the lines that did 
not engage in discriminatory acts suffered in reputation because of those that 
did, but at no point is there any indication of the number of corporations  (of a 
potential of 500 to 1200) that were governed  by the ICC that actually 
discriminated in rates. The true scope and degree of discrimination, along with 
the factors that led to the discriminations, are in need of further investigation.  
The farmers are often portrayed as the virtuous passive victims of the 
railroads; this review does not support this depiction. This review strongly 
suggests that a more balanced approach to the story of the “evil” railroads and 
virtuous yeomen farmers is indicated.  
 
 
6) Finally, while this work has attempted to place the origin of the ICA in the 
context of the political, economical, judicial, and social movements that led to 
its origin additional research is still needed. It indicates that it is only through 
the fullest understanding of how a legislative act comes into existence, the 
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motivations and driving forces behind the act, that its appropriate place in 
history is established. 
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